linux-kernel - [ 075/143] random32: fix off-by-one in seeding requirement

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Date:	Mon, 12 May 2014 02:33:15 +0200
From:	Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
	Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Subject: [ 075/143] random32: fix off-by-one in seeding requirement

2.6.32-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>

[ Upstream commit 51c37a70aaa3f95773af560e6db3073520513912 ]

For properly initialising the Tausworthe generator [1], we have
a strict seeding requirement, that is, s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15.

Commit 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement") introduced
a __seed() function that imposes boundary checks proposed by the
errata paper [2] to properly ensure above conditions.

However, we're off by one, as the function is implemented as:
"return (x < m) ? x + m : x;", and called with __seed(X, 1),
__seed(X, 7), __seed(X, 15). Thus, an unwanted seed of 1, 7, 15
would be possible, whereas the lower boundary should actually
be of at least 2, 8, 16, just as GSL does. Fix this, as otherwise
an initialization with an unwanted seed could have the effect
that Tausworthe's PRNG properties cannot not be ensured.

Note that this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel.

 [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
 [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps

Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.

Fixes: 697f8d0348a6 ("random32: seeding improvement")
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
---
 lib/random32.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 217d5c4..b9275d2 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void srandom32(u32 entropy)
 	 */
 	for_each_possible_cpu (i) {
 		struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i);
-		state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 1);
+		state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2);
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(srandom32);
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ static int __init random32_init(void)
 		struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state,i);
 
 #define LCG(x)	((x) * 69069)	/* super-duper LCG */
-		state->s1 = __seed(LCG(i + jiffies), 1);
-		state->s2 = __seed(LCG(state->s1), 7);
-		state->s3 = __seed(LCG(state->s2), 15);
+		state->s1 = __seed(LCG(i + jiffies), 2);
+		state->s2 = __seed(LCG(state->s1), 8);
+		state->s3 = __seed(LCG(state->s2), 16);
 
 		/* "warm it up" */
 		__random32(state);
@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ static int __init random32_reseed(void)
 		u32 seeds[3];
 
 		get_random_bytes(&seeds, sizeof(seeds));
-		state->s1 = __seed(seeds[0], 1);
-		state->s2 = __seed(seeds[1], 7);
-		state->s3 = __seed(seeds[2], 15);
+		state->s1 = __seed(seeds[0], 2);
+		state->s2 = __seed(seeds[1], 8);
+		state->s3 = __seed(seeds[2], 16);
 
 		/* mix it in */
 		__random32(state);
-- 
1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty



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