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Date: Thu, 22 May 2014 17:28:57 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...il.com>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
Alex Thorlton <athorlton@....com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@...il.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Dario Faggioli <raistlin@...ux.it>,
Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@...il.com>,
liguang <lig.fnst@...fujitsu.com>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] seccomp: introduce writer locking
On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 4:05 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> Normally, task_struct.seccomp.filter is only ever read or modified by
> the task that owns it (current). This property aids in fast access
> during system call filtering as read access is lockless.
>
> Updating the pointer from another task, however, opens up race
> conditions. To allow cross-task filter pointer updates, writes to the
> seccomp fields are now protected by a spinlock. Read access remains
> lockless because pointer updates themselves are atomic. However, writes
> (or cloning) often entail additional checking (like maximum instruction
> counts) which require locking to perform safely.
>
> In the case of cloning threads, the child is invisible to the system
> until it enters the task list. To make sure a child can't be cloned
> from a thread and left in a prior state, seccomp duplication is moved
> under the tasklist_lock. Then parent and child are certain have the same
> seccomp state when they exit the lock.
>
> Based on patches by Will Drewry and David Drysdale.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
> include/linux/init_task.h | 8 ++++++++
> include/linux/sched.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/seccomp.h | 6 ++++--
> kernel/fork.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> kernel/seccomp.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
> 5 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
> index 6df7f9fe0d01..e2370ec3102b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/init_task.h
> +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
> @@ -154,6 +154,13 @@ extern struct task_group root_task_group;
> # define INIT_VTIME(tsk)
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> +# define INIT_SECCOMP(tsk) \
> + .seccomp.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(tsk.seccomp.lock),
> +#else
> +# define INIT_SECCOMP(tsk)
> +#endif
> +
> #define INIT_TASK_COMM "swapper"
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
> @@ -234,6 +241,7 @@ extern struct task_group root_task_group;
> INIT_CPUSET_SEQ(tsk) \
> INIT_RT_MUTEXES(tsk) \
> INIT_VTIME(tsk) \
> + INIT_SECCOMP(tsk) \
> }
>
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index 25f54c79f757..71a6cb66a3f3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -2480,6 +2480,26 @@ static inline void task_unlock(struct task_struct *p)
> spin_unlock(&p->alloc_lock);
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> +/*
> + * Protects changes to ->seccomp
> + */
> +static inline void seccomp_lock(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long *flags)
> +{
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&p->seccomp.lock, (*flags));
> +}
> +
> +static inline void seccomp_unlock(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&p->seccomp.lock, flags);
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline void seccomp_lock(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long *flags)
> +{ }
> +static inline void seccomp_unlock(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long flags)
> +{ }
> +#endif
> +
> extern struct sighand_struct *__lock_task_sighand(struct task_struct *tsk,
> unsigned long *flags);
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> index 4054b0994071..c47be00e8ffb 100644
> --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> @@ -14,14 +14,16 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
> *
> * @mode: indicates one of the valid values above for controlled
> * system calls available to a process.
> - * @filter: The metadata and ruleset for determining what system calls
> - * are allowed for a task.
> + * @lock: held when making changes to avoid thread races.
> + * @filter: must always point to a valid seccomp-filter or NULL as it is
> + * accessed without locking during system call entry.
> *
> * @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
> * is no locking.
> */
> struct seccomp {
> int mode;
> + spinlock_t lock;
> struct seccomp_filter *filter;
> };
>
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 54a8d26f612f..e08a1907cd78 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -315,6 +315,15 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig)
> goto free_ti;
>
> tsk->stack = ti;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> + /*
> + * We must handle setting up seccomp filters once we're under
> + * the tasklist_lock in case orig has changed between now and
> + * then. Until then, filter must be NULL to avoid messing up
> + * the usage counts on the error path calling free_task.
> + */
> + tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL;
> +#endif
>
> setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig);
> clear_user_return_notifier(tsk);
> @@ -1081,6 +1090,24 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static void copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> + /* Child lock not needed since it is not yet in tasklist. */
> + unsigned long irqflags;
> + seccomp_lock(current, &irqflags);
> +
> + get_seccomp_filter(current);
> + p->seccomp = current->seccomp;
> + spin_lock_init(&p->seccomp.lock);
> +
> + if (p->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
> + set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SECCOMP);
> +
> + seccomp_unlock(current, irqflags);
> +#endif
> +}
> +
> SYSCALL_DEFINE1(set_tid_address, int __user *, tidptr)
> {
> current->clear_child_tid = tidptr;
> @@ -1196,7 +1223,6 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
> goto fork_out;
>
> ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
> - get_seccomp_filter(p);
>
> rt_mutex_init_task(p);
>
> @@ -1425,6 +1451,12 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
> */
> write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
>
> + /*
> + * Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed
> + * before holding tasklist_lock.
> + */
> + copy_seccomp(p);
> +
> /* CLONE_PARENT re-uses the old parent */
> if (clone_flags & (CLONE_PARENT|CLONE_THREAD)) {
> p->real_parent = current->real_parent;
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 481504100b1d..d200029728ca 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -174,12 +174,12 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
> */
> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
> {
> - struct seccomp_filter *f;
> + struct seccomp_filter *f = smp_load_acquire(¤t->seccomp.filter);
> struct seccomp_data sd;
> u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
>
> /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
> - if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
> + if (WARN_ON(f == NULL))
> return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>
> populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
> @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
> * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
> * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
> */
> - for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
> + for (; f; f = smp_load_acquire(&f->prev)) {
> u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter_int_seccomp(&sd, f->insnsi);
indeed. the conflicts here will be trivial to resolve. Not sure what
tree you're using
for these patches. Can we avoid the conflicts all together?
Could you rebase against linux-next at least?
> if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
> ret = cur_ret;
> @@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ out:
> * _seccomp_attach_filter: validated and attach filter
> * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
> *
> + * Caller must be holding the seccomp lock.
> + *
> * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
> */
> static long _seccomp_attach_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> @@ -312,6 +314,8 @@ static long _seccomp_attach_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> unsigned long total_insns;
> struct seccomp_filter *walker;
>
> + BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->seccomp.lock));
> +
> /* Validate resulting filter length. */
> total_insns = filter->len;
> for (walker = current->seccomp.filter; walker; walker = filter->prev)
> @@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ static long _seccomp_attach_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> * task reference.
> */
> filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
> - current->seccomp.filter = filter;
> + smp_store_release(¤t->seccomp.filter, filter);
>
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -332,7 +336,7 @@ static long _seccomp_attach_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> /* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
> void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
> {
> - struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
> + struct seccomp_filter *orig = smp_load_acquire(&tsk->seccomp.filter);
> if (!orig)
> return;
> /* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
> @@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
> /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
> while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
> struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
> - orig = orig->prev;
> + orig = smp_load_acquire(&orig->prev);
> kfree(freeme);
> }
> }
> @@ -498,6 +502,7 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
> static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
> {
> struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
> + unsigned long irqflags;
> long ret = -EINVAL;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> @@ -509,6 +514,8 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
> }
> #endif
>
> + seccomp_lock(current, &irqflags);
> +
> if (current->seccomp.mode &&
> current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
> goto out;
> @@ -536,6 +543,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
> current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
> set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
> out:
> + seccomp_unlock(current, irqflags);
> kfree(prepared);
> return ret;
> }
> --
> 1.7.9.5
>
> --
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