linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Wed, 28 May 2014 22:43:57 -0400
From:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:	Philipp Kern <pkern@...gle.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
	"security@...nel.org" <security@...nel.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@...ah.com>, linux-audit@...hat.com,
	stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds
 checking

On Wed, 2014-05-28 at 19:27 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 7:23 PM, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, 2014-05-28 at 18:44 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
> >>
> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
> >>
> >> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
> >> ---
> >>  kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
> >>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> index f251a5e..7ccd9db 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> >> @@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
> >>       return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
> >>  }
> >>
> >> +static bool audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
> >> +{
> >> +     int word, bit;
> >> +
> >> +     if (val > 0xffffffff)
> >> +             return false;
> >
> > Why is this necessary?
> 
> To avoid an integer overflow.  Admittedly, this particular overflow
> won't cause a crash, but it will cause incorrect results.

You know this code pre-dates git?  I admit, I'm shocked no one ever
noticed it before!  This is ANCIENT.  And clearly broken.

I'll likely ask Richard to add a WARN_ONCE() in both this place, and
below in word > AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE so we might know if we ever need a
larger bitmask to store syscall numbers....

It'd be nice if lib had a efficient bitmask implementation...

> >
> >> +
> >> +     word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
> >> +     if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
> >> +             return false;
> >
> > Since this covers it and it extensible...
> >
> >> +
> >> +     bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
> >> +
> >> +     return rule->mask[word] & bit;
> >
> > Returning an int as a bool creates worse code than just returning the
> > int.  (although in this case if the compiler chooses to inline it might
> > be smart enough not to actually convert this int to a bool and make
> > worse assembly...)   I'd suggest the function here return an int.  bools
> > usually make the assembly worse...
> 
> I'm ambivalent.  The right assembly would use flags on x86, not an int
> or a bool, and I don't know what the compiler will do.

Also, clearly X86_X32 was implemented without audit support, so we
shouldn't config it in.  What do you think of this?

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 25d2c6f..fa852e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK if X86_64
 	select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
-	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL if !X86_X32
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool y


--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/