| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 22:14:08 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
keyrings <keyrings@...ux-nfs.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 4/4] KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring
On Sat, 2014-05-31 at 01:37 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 28 May 2014 18:09, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > (UEFI) secure boot provides a signature chain of trust rooted in
> > hardware. The signature chain of trust includes the Machine Owner
> > Keys(MOKs), which cannot be modified without physical presence.
> >
> > Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
> > key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted
> > keyring, this patch further restricts the certificates to those
> > signed by the machine owner's key or chosen key.
> >
> > This patch defines an owner trusted keyring, defines a new boot
> > command line option 'keyring=' to designate the machine owner's
> > chosen key, and renames the function get_system_trusted_keyring()
> > to get_system_or_owner_trusted_keyring().
> >
> > This patch permits the machine owner to safely identify their own
> > or chosen key, without requiring it to be builtin the kernel.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar<zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 +-
> > include/keys/system_keyring.h | 15 ++++--
> > include/linux/key.h | 4 ++
> > kernel/system_keyring.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > security/keys/key.c | 20 ++++++++
> > 5 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> > index 1af8a30..6d52790 100644
> > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> > @@ -237,7 +237,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> > if (ret < 0)
> > goto error_free_cert;
> > } else {
> > - ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
> > + ret = x509_validate_trust(cert,
> > + get_system_or_owner_trusted_keyring());
> > if (!ret)
> > prep->trusted = 1;
> > }
> > diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> > index 72665eb..f665c33 100644
> > --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> > +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> > @@ -17,15 +17,20 @@
> > #include <linux/key.h>
> >
> > extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
> > -static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
> > -{
> > - return system_trusted_keyring;
> > -}
> > +extern struct key *owner_trusted_keyring;
> > +
> > +extern struct key *get_system_or_owner_trusted_keyring(void);
> > +extern void load_owner_identified_uefi_key(key_ref_t key);
> > +
> > #else
> > -static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
> > +static inline struct key *get_system_or_owner_trusted_keyring(void)
> > {
> > return NULL;
> > }
> > +
> > +static void load_owner_identified_uefi_key(key_ref_t key)
> > +{
> > +}
> > #endif
> >
> > #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
> > diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
> > index cd0abb8..861843a 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/key.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/key.h
> > @@ -267,6 +267,10 @@ extern int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr);
> >
> > extern int key_validate(const struct key *key);
> >
> > +extern int key_match(key_ref_t key,
> > + const char *type,
> > + const char *description);
> > +
> > extern key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring,
> > const char *type,
> > const char *description,
> > diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
> > index 52ebc70..e9b14ac 100644
> > --- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
> > +++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
> > @@ -19,11 +19,75 @@
> > #include "module-internal.h"
> >
> > struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
> > +struct key *owner_trusted_keyring;
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
> >
> > extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
> > extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
> >
> > +static int use_owner_trusted_keyring;
> > +
> > +static char *owner_keyid;
> > +static int builtin_keyring;
> > +static int __init default_keyring_set(char *str)
> > +{
> > + if (!str) /* default: builtin */
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + if (strcmp(str, "system") == 0) /* use system keyring */
> > + ;
> > + else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) /* only builtin keys */
> > + builtin_keyring = 1;
> > + else
> > + owner_keyid = str; /* owner local key 'id:xxxxxx' */
> > + return 1;
> > +}
> > +__setup("keyring=", default_keyring_set);
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Load the owner identified key on the 'owner' trusted keyring.
> > + */
> > +void load_owner_identified_uefi_key(key_ref_t key)
> > +{
> > + if (!owner_keyid || use_owner_trusted_keyring)
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (!key_match(key, "asymmetric", owner_keyid))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (key_link(owner_trusted_keyring, key_ref_to_ptr(key)) == 0) {
> > + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &owner_trusted_keyring->flags);
> > + use_owner_trusted_keyring = 1;
>
> This is a bit strange...
> Linking any key forces to use owner trusted keyring...
Wouldn't it be stranger to identify a specific key on the system keyring
and add it to the owner keyring, but then not use it? I don't
understand your concern. What is the problem?
> > + pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s' on .owner_keyring\n",
> > + key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void load_owner_identified_builtin_key(key_ref_t key)
> > +{
> > + if (!owner_keyid && !builtin_keyring)
> > + return;
> > +
>
> It looks like builtin_keyring is useless...
> Is it like linking all .system keys to owners keyring???
>
> Why not just to return .system keyring in get_system_or_owner_trusted_keyring()
> based on owner_keyid?
Before David and Josh's proposed UEFI secure boot patches, only the
builtin keys are on the system keyring. After those patches, the UEFI
secure boot keys, including the MOK keys, are there as well.
I think splitting this patch up into before and after adding the secure
boot keys to the system keyring, would help clarify this patch.
Mimi
>
>
> > + if (!builtin_keyring && !key_match(key, "asymmetric", owner_keyid))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (key_link(owner_trusted_keyring, key_ref_to_ptr(key)) == 0) {
> > + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &owner_trusted_keyring->flags);
> > + use_owner_trusted_keyring = 1;
>
> The same...
> Linking any key forces to use owner trusted keyring...
>
>
> > + pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s' on .owner_keyring\n",
> > + key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Use the owner_trusted_keyring if available
> > + */
> > +struct key *get_system_or_owner_trusted_keyring(void)
> > +{
> > + return use_owner_trusted_keyring ? owner_trusted_keyring :
> > + system_trusted_keyring;
> > +}
> > +
> > /*
> > * Load the compiled-in keys
> > */
> > @@ -50,6 +114,25 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
> > device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
> >
> > /*
> > + * Load the owner trusted key
> > + */
> > +static __init int owner_trusted_keyring_init(void)
> > +{
> > + pr_notice("Initialize the owner trusted keyring\n");
> > +
> > + owner_trusted_keyring =
> > + keyring_alloc(".owner_keyring",
> > + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
> > + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
> > + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
> > + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
> > + if (IS_ERR(owner_trusted_keyring))
> > + panic("Can't allocate owner trusted keyring\n");
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +device_initcall(owner_trusted_keyring_init);
> > +
> > +/*
> > * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
> > */
> > static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
> > @@ -91,6 +174,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
> > } else {
> > pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
> > key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
> > +
> > + load_owner_identified_builtin_key(key);
> > key_ref_put(key);
> > }
> > p += plen;
> > diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
> > index 2048a11..b448ab1 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/key.c
> > +++ b/security/keys/key.c
> > @@ -701,6 +701,26 @@ void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype)
> > up_read(&key_types_sem);
> > }
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Use the key type's match function to compare the key's id.
> > + */
> > +int key_match(key_ref_t key, const char *type, const char *description)
> > +{
> > + struct keyring_index_key index_key;
> > + int ret = 0;
> > +
> > + index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type);
> > + if (IS_ERR(index_key.type))
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + if (index_key.type->match &&
> > + index_key.type->match(key_ref_to_ptr(key), description))
> > + ret = 1;
> > + key_type_put(index_key.type);
> > +out:
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > /*
> > * Attempt to update an existing key.
> > *
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists