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Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 11:45:20 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
keyrings <keyrings@...ux-nfs.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 3/4] ima: define '.ima' as a builtin 'trusted'
keyring
On 07/06/14 02:27, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Sat, 2014-06-07 at 00:53 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> On 3 June 2014 20:58, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>>> Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
>>> existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
>>>
>>> Changelog v5:
>>> - Move integrity_init_keyring() to init_ima() - Dmitry
>>> - reset keyring[id] on failure - Dmitry
>>>
>>> Changelog v1:
>>> - don't link IMA trusted keyring to user keyring
>>>
>>> Changelog:
>>> - define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
>>> - differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
>>> - replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)
>>> - only make the IMA keyring a trusted keyring (reported-by D. Kastatkin)
>>> - define stub integrity_init_keyring() definition based on
>>> CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE, not CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
>>> (reported-by Jim Davis)
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar<zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>> ---
>>> security/integrity/digsig.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 ++++++++++--
>>> security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++++
>>> 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
>>> index b4af4eb..fa4c2fd 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
>>> @@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
>>> #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
>>>
>>> #include <linux/err.h>
>>> +#include <linux/sched.h>
>>> #include <linux/rbtree.h>
>>> +#include <linux/cred.h>
>>> #include <linux/key-type.h>
>>> #include <linux/digsig.h>
>>>
>>> @@ -24,7 +26,11 @@ static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
>>> static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
>>> "_evm",
>>> "_module",
>>> +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>>> "_ima",
>>> +#else
>>> + ".ima",
>>> +#endif
>>> };
>>>
>>> int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
>>> @@ -56,3 +62,23 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
>>>
>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>> }
>>> +
>>> +int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
>>> +{
>>> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>>> +
>>> + keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
>>> + KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
>>> + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
>>> + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
>>> + KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
>>> + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
>>> + if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
>>> + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
>>> + else {
>>> + pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%ld)\n",
>>> + keyring_name[id], PTR_ERR(keyring[id]));
>>> + keyring[id] = NULL;
>>> + }
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
>>> index 81a2797..dad8d4c 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
>>> @@ -123,3 +123,11 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
>>> For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
>>> <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
>>> If unsure, say N.
>>> +
>>> +config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>>> + bool "Require all keys on the _ima keyring be signed"
>>> + depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>>> + default y
>>> + help
>>> + This option requires that all keys added to the _ima
>>> + keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>> index 09baa33..4c60cc5 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>> @@ -328,8 +328,16 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
>>>
>>> hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
>>> error = ima_init();
>>> - if (!error)
>>> - ima_initialized = 1;
>>> + if (error)
>>> + goto out;
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>>> + error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
>>> + if (error)
>>> + goto out;
>>> +#endif
>> integrity_init_keyring() has variation in header file...
>> Why do you need #ifdef in .c file? You you usually do not like it...
> Up to now, unsigned certificates could be added to the IMA keyring. We
> can not all of a sudden require all keys being added to the IMA keyring
> to be signed. Although there is a stub integrity_init_keyring()
> function definition, it is based on CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE, not
> CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING.
>
> Right, ifdef's don't belong in C code. One solution would be to define
> ima_init_keyring() as a wrapper for integrity_init_keyring() and a stub
> function.
>
> Mimi
I think 'ima_init_keyring" could be a good approach.
>From other hand, if you look to kernel/module.c, then you will find ~40
#ifdefs of the source code...
So it may be indeed clear from __init point of view what we initialize
and what not...
- Dmitry
>>> + ima_initialized = 1;
>>> +out:
>>> return error;
>>> }
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
>>> index 33c0a70..09c440d 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
>>> @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
>>> int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
>>> const char *digest, int digestlen);
>>>
>>> +int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
>>> #else
>>>
>>> static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
>>> @@ -133,6 +134,10 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>> }
>>>
>>> +static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
>>> +{
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
>>>
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
>>> --
>>> 1.8.1.4
>>>
>>> --
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>>
>>
>
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