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Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:50:30 -0400
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 3.14 11/68] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
crypto/crypto_user.c | 2 +-
drivers/connector/cn_proc.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
net/can/gw.c | 4 ++--
net/core/rtnetlink.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
net/dcb/dcbnl.c | 2 +-
net/decnet/dn_dev.c | 4 ++--
net/decnet/dn_fib.c | 4 ++--
net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 2 +-
net/netlink/genetlink.c | 2 +-
net/packet/diag.c | 2 +-
net/phonet/pn_netlink.c | 8 ++++----
net/sched/act_api.c | 2 +-
net/sched/cls_api.c | 2 +-
net/sched/sch_api.c | 6 +++---
net/tipc/netlink.c | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
19 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk
type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE;
link = &crypto_dispatch[type];
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) &&
--- a/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
+++ b/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static void cn_proc_mcast_ctl(struct cn_
return;
/* Can only change if privileged. */
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!__netlink_ns_capable(nsp, &init_user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = EPERM;
goto out;
}
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ scsi_nl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)
goto next_msg;
}
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto next_msg;
}
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -639,13 +639,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_bu
case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
case AUDIT_TRIM:
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
default: /* bad msg */
--- a/net/can/gw.c
+++ b/net/can/gw.c
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ static int cgw_create_job(struct sk_buff
u8 limhops = 0;
int err = 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*r))
@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static int cgw_remove_job(struct sk_buff
u8 limhops = 0;
int err = 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*r))
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1428,7 +1428,8 @@ static int do_set_master(struct net_devi
return 0;
}
-static int do_setlink(struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
+static int do_setlink(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
struct nlattr **tb, char *ifname, int modified)
{
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
@@ -1440,7 +1441,7 @@ static int do_setlink(struct net_device
err = PTR_ERR(net);
goto errout;
}
- if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto errout;
}
@@ -1694,7 +1695,7 @@ static int rtnl_setlink(struct sk_buff *
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
- err = do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, ifname, 0);
+ err = do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, ifname, 0);
errout:
return err;
}
@@ -1811,7 +1812,8 @@ err:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtnl_create_link);
-static int rtnl_group_changelink(struct net *net, int group,
+static int rtnl_group_changelink(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct net *net, int group,
struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
struct nlattr **tb)
{
@@ -1820,7 +1822,7 @@ static int rtnl_group_changelink(struct
for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
if (dev->group == group) {
- err = do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, NULL, 0);
+ err = do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, NULL, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
@@ -1962,12 +1964,12 @@ replay:
modified = 1;
}
- return do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, ifname, modified);
+ return do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, ifname, modified);
}
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE)) {
if (ifm->ifi_index == 0 && tb[IFLA_GROUP])
- return rtnl_group_changelink(net,
+ return rtnl_group_changelink(skb, net,
nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_GROUP]),
ifm, tb);
return -ENODEV;
@@ -2354,7 +2356,7 @@ static int rtnl_fdb_del(struct sk_buff *
int err = -EINVAL;
__u8 *addr;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*ndm), tb, NDA_MAX, NULL);
@@ -2806,7 +2808,7 @@ static int rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_b
sz_idx = type>>2;
kind = type&3;
- if (kind != 2 && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (kind != 2 && !netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) {
--- a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
+++ b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
@@ -1669,7 +1669,7 @@ static int dcb_doit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct nlmsghdr *reply_nlh = NULL;
const struct reply_func *fn;
- if ((nlh->nlmsg_type == RTM_SETDCB) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((nlh->nlmsg_type == RTM_SETDCB) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ret = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*dcb), tb, DCB_ATTR_MAX,
--- a/net/decnet/dn_dev.c
+++ b/net/decnet/dn_dev.c
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int dn_nl_deladdr(struct sk_buff
struct dn_ifaddr __rcu **ifap;
int err = -EINVAL;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ static int dn_nl_newaddr(struct sk_buff
struct dn_ifaddr *ifa;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
--- a/net/decnet/dn_fib.c
+++ b/net/decnet/dn_fib.c
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static int dn_fib_rtm_delroute(struct sk
struct nlattr *attrs[RTA_MAX+1];
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int dn_fib_rtm_newroute(struct sk
struct nlattr *attrs[RTA_MAX+1];
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_sk
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static void nfnetlink_rcv(struct sk_buff
skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
- if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
netlink_ack(skb, nlh, -EPERM);
return;
}
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ static int genl_family_rcv_msg(struct ge
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
- !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) == NLM_F_DUMP) {
--- a/net/packet/diag.c
+++ b/net/packet/diag.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int packet_diag_dump(struct sk_bu
net = sock_net(skb->sk);
req = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
- may_report_filterinfo = ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+ may_report_filterinfo = netlink_net_capable(cb->skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
mutex_lock(&net->packet.sklist_lock);
sk_for_each(sk, &net->packet.sklist) {
--- a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ static int addr_doit(struct sk_buff *skb
int err;
u8 pnaddr;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ASSERT_RTNL();
@@ -233,10 +233,10 @@ static int route_doit(struct sk_buff *sk
int err;
u8 dst;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ASSERT_RTNL();
--- a/net/sched/act_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_api.c
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_action(struct sk_buff
u32 portid = skb ? NETLINK_CB(skb).portid : 0;
int ret = 0, ovr = 0;
- if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETACTION) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETACTION) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ret = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(struct tcamsg), tca, TCA_ACT_MAX, NULL);
--- a/net/sched/cls_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_tfilter(struct sk_buff
int err;
int tp_created = 0;
- if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTFILTER) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTFILTER) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
replay:
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ static int tc_get_qdisc(struct sk_buff *
struct Qdisc *p = NULL;
int err;
- if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETQDISC) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETQDISC) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(*tcm), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL);
@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buf
struct Qdisc *q, *p;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
replay:
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_tclass(struct sk_buff
u32 qid;
int err;
- if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTCLASS) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTCLASS) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(*tcm), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL);
--- a/net/tipc/netlink.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int handle_cmd(struct sk_buff *sk
int hdr_space = nlmsg_total_size(GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
u16 cmd;
- if ((req_userhdr->cmd & 0xC000) && (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
+ if ((req_userhdr->cmd & 0xC000) && (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
cmd = TIPC_CMD_NOT_NET_ADMIN;
else
cmd = req_userhdr->cmd;
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_b
link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
- if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
--
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