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Date: Mon, 04 Aug 2014 12:13:13 +0200
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...ux.intel.com>,
Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@...mens.com>
CC: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>,
Gleb Natapov <gleb@...nel.org>, Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>,
Zhang Yang <yang.z.zhang@...el.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: nVMX: nested TPR shadow/threshold emulation
Il 04/08/2014 12:11, Wanpeng Li ha scritto:
> Hi Paolo,
> On Fri, Aug 01, 2014 at 11:05:13AM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> Il 01/08/2014 10:09, Wanpeng Li ha scritto:
>>> This patch fix bug https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=61411
>>>
>>> TPR shadow/threshold feature is important to speed up the Windows guest.
>>> Besides, it is a must feature for certain VMM.
>>>
>>> We map virtual APIC page address and TPR threshold from L1 VMCS. If
>>> TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD VM exit is triggered by L2 guest and L1 interested
>>> in, we inject it into L1 VMM for handling.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...ux.intel.com>
>>> ---
>>> v1 -> v2:
>>> * don't take L0's "virtualize APIC accesses" setting into account
>>> * virtual_apic_page do exactly the same thing that is done for apic_access_page
>>> * add the tpr threshold field to the read-write fields for shadow VMCS
>>>
>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>> 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>> index a3845b8..0e6e95e 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>> @@ -379,6 +379,7 @@ struct nested_vmx {
>>> * we must keep them pinned while L2 runs.
>>> */
>>> struct page *apic_access_page;
>>> + struct page *virtual_apic_page;
>>> u64 msr_ia32_feature_control;
>>>
>>> struct hrtimer preemption_timer;
>>> @@ -533,6 +534,7 @@ static int max_shadow_read_only_fields =
>>> ARRAY_SIZE(shadow_read_only_fields);
>>>
>>> static unsigned long shadow_read_write_fields[] = {
>>> + TPR_THRESHOLD,
>>> GUEST_RIP,
>>> GUEST_RSP,
>>> GUEST_CR0,
>>> @@ -2331,7 +2333,7 @@ static __init void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(void)
>>> CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING | CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |
>>> CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS | CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING |
>>> CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING | CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING |
>>> - CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING |
>>> + CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING | CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |
>>> CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS;
>>> /*
>>> * We can allow some features even when not supported by the
>>> @@ -6149,6 +6151,10 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>> nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
>>> vmx->nested.apic_access_page = 0;
>>> }
>>> + if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page) {
>>> + nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
>>> + vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = 0;
>>> + }
>>>
>>> nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(vmx);
>>> }
>>> @@ -6937,7 +6943,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
>>> return 0;
>>> case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
>>> - return 1;
>>> + return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
>>> case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
>>> return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
>>> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
>>> @@ -7058,6 +7064,9 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>
>>> static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
>>> {
>>> + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> if (irr == -1 || tpr < irr) {
>>> vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
>>> return;
>>> @@ -8025,6 +8034,22 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>> exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING;
>>> exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
>>> exec_control |= vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
>>> +
>>> + if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
>>> + if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
>>> + nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
>>> + vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page =
>>> + nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr);
>>> + if (!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
>>> + exec_control &=
>>> + ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
>>
>> This will cause L1 to miss exits when L2 writes to CR8. I think the
>> only sensible thing to do if this happens is fail the vmentry.
>>
>> The problem is that while the APIC access page field is used to trap
>> reads/writes to the APIC access page itself, here the processor will
>> read/write the virtual APIC page when L2 does CR8 accesses.
>
> How about add this:
>
> + if (!(exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) &&
> + !((exec_control & CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING) &&
> + (exec_control & CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING)))
> + nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
Yes, this is not architecturally correct, but I don't see what else we
can do.
Paolo
>
> Regards,
> Wanpeng Li
>
>>
>> Paolo
>>> + else
>>> + vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
>>> + page_to_phys(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page));
>>> +
>>> + vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, vmcs12->tpr_threshold);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> /*
>>> * Merging of IO and MSR bitmaps not currently supported.
>>> * Rather, exit every time.
>>> @@ -8793,6 +8818,10 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
>>> nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
>>> vmx->nested.apic_access_page = 0;
>>> }
>>> + if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page) {
>>> + nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
>>> + vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = 0;
>>> + }
>>>
>>> /*
>>> * Exiting from L2 to L1, we're now back to L1 which thinks it just
>>>
--
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