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Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 11:34:21 +0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.17 119/146] ima: pass opened flag to identify newly created files
3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
commit 3034a146820c26fe6da66a45f6340fe87fe0983a upstream.
Empty files and missing xattrs do not guarantee that a file was
just created. This patch passes FILE_CREATED flag to IMA to
reliably identify new files.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
fs/namei.c | 2 +-
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 2 +-
include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 ++++++++--------
6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3074,7 +3074,7 @@ opened:
error = open_check_o_direct(file);
if (error)
goto exit_fput;
- error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
+ error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode, *opened);
if (error)
goto exit_fput;
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
*filp = NULL;
} else {
- host_err = ima_file_check(*filp, may_flags);
+ host_err = ima_file_check(*filp, may_flags, 0);
if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE)
(*filp)->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH;
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ struct linux_binprm;
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
+extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct
return 0;
}
-static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
{
return 0;
}
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void);
int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len);
+ int xattr_len, int opened);
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measureme
struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len)
+ int xattr_len, int opened)
{
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry
int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len)
+ int xattr_len, int opened)
{
static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
char *cause = "unknown";
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, s
cause = "missing-hash";
status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
- if (inode->i_size == 0) {
+ if (opened & FILE_CREATED) {
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
- int mask, int function)
+ int mask, int function, int opened)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct fi
xattr_value, xattr_len);
if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
- xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
kfree(pathbuf);
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ out:
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
- return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
return 0;
}
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *
return process_measurement(bprm->file,
(strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
}
/**
@@ -290,12 +290,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
{
ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
return process_measurement(file, NULL,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
- FILE_CHECK);
+ FILE_CHECK, opened);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
#endif
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
}
- return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
}
int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file,
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
return 0;
}
- return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
--
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