linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] x86, entry: Switch stacks on a paranoid entry from userspace

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Date:	Tue, 11 Nov 2014 18:01:50 -0800
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@...el.com>
Cc:	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86, entry: Switch stacks on a paranoid entry from userspace

On Tue, Nov 11, 2014 at 5:06 PM, Luck, Tony <tony.luck@...el.com> wrote:
>> I've thought about one sneaky option.  If we can reliably determine
>> that we're an innocent bystander of a broadcast #MC, can we send an
>> IPI-to-self and return without clearing MCIP?  Then we get another
>> interrupt as soon as interrupts are enabled, and we can clear MCIP at
>> a time when we're definitely not running on the IST stack.
>
> Innocent bystanders have RIPV=1, EIPV=0 in MCG_STATUS ... so they
> are quite easy to spot.  Perhaps we might look at subverting the silly
> broadcast by just having them immediately clear MCG_STATUS and iret
> (i.e. not go to do_machine_check() at all).  That would require lots of
> surgery to do_machine_check() and friends - now it wouldn't be sure
> how many processors to expect to show up.  It also opens a different
> window - once they are back running normal code they might trip another
> machine check while the victims of the first are still processing - so
> another "boom, you're dead".  The advantage of hitting everyone
> with the machine check is that it lessens the chance that another will
> happen as everyone is running looking at a few pages of kernel code
> & data.
>
> The worrying part in that is "as soon as interrupts are enabled". Until
> we do clear MCIP we're sitting in a mode where another machine check
> means instant death no saving throw.  Nominally better than the "we'll
> mess the stack up for you" that we are trying to avoid - but the old window
> is quite short and known to be bounded. The new one might be a lot bigger.

Yeah, fair enough.

The annoying thing is that there's no way to atomically return from
interrupt and clear MCIP.

Here's a different idea.  In do_machine_check, check if (regs->sp
points at the machine check IST stack && !user_mode(regs)) and, if so,
declare the machine check to be unrecoverable.  There are a couple
ways this can happen:

 - This is a second #MC that hit after clearing MCIP and before
returning.  It's genuinely unrecoverable (we're well and truly screwed
at this point), but we probably won't actually crash unless we try to
return.

 - This is a normal #MC that hit in kernel mode during a time when sp
was bogus and coincidentally pointed at the #MC IST stack.

This isn't perfect.  A malicious user can do dummy syscalls in a loop
on one CPU with rsp pointing at the IST stack and try to cause a
machine check on a different CPU, causing the system to panic when it
thinks that the first CPU had a recursive IST usage.  I think that we
probably have bigger problems if a malicious user can cause machine
checks, though.

--Andy
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