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Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 16:17:30 +0400
From: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@...gle.com>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>,
Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@...il.com>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...il.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 08/12] mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support
for slub allocator
FYI, when I backported Kasan to 3.14, in kasan_mark_slab_padding()
sometimes a negative size of padding was generated. This started
working when the patch below was applied:
@@ -262,12 +264,11 @@ void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page,
unsigned int order)
void kasan_mark_slab_padding(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
struct page *page)
{
- unsigned long object_end = (unsigned long)object + s->size;
- unsigned long padding_start = round_up(object_end,
- KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
- unsigned long padding_end = (unsigned long)page_address(page) +
- (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
- size_t size = padding_end - padding_start;
+ unsigned long page_start = (unsigned long) page_address(page);
+ unsigned long page_end = page_start + (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
+ unsigned long padding_start = round_up(page_end - s->reserved,
+ KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+ size_t size = page_end - padding_start;
kasan_poison_shadow((void *)padding_start, size, KASAN_SLAB_PADDING);
}
Also, in kasan_slab_free you poison the shadow with FREE not just the
object space, but also redzones. This is inefficient and will mistake
right out-of-bounds error for the next object with use-after-free.
This is fixed here
https://github.com/google/kasan/commit/4b3238be392ba0bc56bbc934ac545df3ff840782
, please patch.
LGTM
On Mon, Nov 24, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com> wrote:
> With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated
> by slub.
> Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as free.
> Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by caller
> number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object
> (including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible).
>
> We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
> There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
> size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole
> allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible.
>
> Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's
> metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
> ---
> include/linux/kasan.h | 21 ++++++++++++
> include/linux/slab.h | 11 ++++--
> lib/Kconfig.kasan | 1 +
> mm/Makefile | 3 ++
> mm/kasan/kasan.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 4 +++
> mm/kasan/report.c | 25 ++++++++++++++
> mm/slab_common.c | 5 ++-
> mm/slub.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++--
> 9 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 9714fba..0463b90 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size);
>
> void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
> void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
> +void kasan_mark_slab_padding(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> + struct page *page);
> +
> +void kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size);
> +void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr);
> +void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object, size_t size);
> +void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size);
> +
> +void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
> +void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
>
> #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> @@ -42,6 +52,17 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_local(void) {}
>
> static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
> static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
> +static inline void kasan_mark_slab_padding(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> + struct page *page) {}
> +
> +static inline void kasan_kmalloc_large(void *ptr, size_t size) {}
> +static inline void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr) {}
> +static inline void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
> + size_t size) {}
> +static inline void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size) {}
> +
> +static inline void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) {}
> +static inline void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) {}
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
> index 8a2457d..5dc0d69 100644
> --- a/include/linux/slab.h
> +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
> @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@
> (unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR)
>
> #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
>
> struct mem_cgroup;
> /*
> @@ -326,7 +327,10 @@ kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
> static __always_inline void *kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
> gfp_t flags, size_t size)
> {
> - return kmem_cache_alloc(s, flags);
> + void *ret = kmem_cache_alloc(s, flags);
> +
> + kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
> + return ret;
> }
>
> static __always_inline void *
> @@ -334,7 +338,10 @@ kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
> gfp_t gfpflags,
> int node, size_t size)
> {
> - return kmem_cache_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node);
> + void *ret = kmem_cache_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node);
> +
> + kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
> + return ret;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_TRACING */
>
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> index 386cc8b..1fa4fe8 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
> config KASAN
> bool "AddressSanitizer: runtime memory debugger"
> depends on !MEMORY_HOTPLUG
> + depends on SLUB_DEBUG
> help
> Enables address sanitizer - runtime memory debugger,
> designed to find out-of-bounds accesses and use-after-free bugs.
> diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
> index 33d9971..5f0138f 100644
> --- a/mm/Makefile
> +++ b/mm/Makefile
> @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
> # Makefile for the linux memory manager.
> #
>
> +KASAN_SANITIZE_slab_common.o := n
> +KASAN_SANITIZE_slub.o := n
> +
> mmu-y := nommu.o
> mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU) := gup.o highmem.o memory.o mincore.o \
> mlock.o mmap.o mprotect.o mremap.o msync.o rmap.o \
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> index b336073..9f5326e 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
> #include <linux/kasan.h>
>
> #include "kasan.h"
> +#include "../slab.h"
>
> /*
> * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
> @@ -261,6 +262,97 @@ void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> }
>
> +void kasan_mark_slab_padding(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> + struct page *page)
> +{
> + unsigned long object_end = (unsigned long)object + s->size;
> + unsigned long padding_start = round_up(object_end,
> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + unsigned long padding_end = (unsigned long)page_address(page) +
> + (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
> + size_t size = padding_end - padding_start;
> +
> + kasan_poison_shadow((void *)padding_start, size, KASAN_SLAB_PADDING);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> +{
> + kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> +{
> + unsigned long size = cache->size;
> + unsigned long rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +
> + /* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
> + if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
> + return;
> +
> + kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size)
> +{
> + unsigned long redzone_start;
> + unsigned long redzone_end;
> +
> + if (unlikely(object == NULL))
> + return;
> +
> + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + redzone_end = (unsigned long)object + cache->size;
> +
> + kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, size);
> + kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> +
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
> +
> +void kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size)
> +{
> + struct page *page;
> + unsigned long redzone_start;
> + unsigned long redzone_end;
> +
> + if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
> + return;
> +
> + page = virt_to_page(ptr);
> + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
> +
> + kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
> + kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> + KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size)
> +{
> + struct page *page;
> +
> + if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
> + return;
> +
> + page = virt_to_head_page(object);
> +
> + if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
> + kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size);
> + else
> + kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr)
> +{
> + struct page *page = virt_to_page(ptr);
> +
> + kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
> + KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> +}
> +
> void __asan_load1(unsigned long addr)
> {
> check_memory_region(addr, 1, false);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 2a6a961..049349b 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
> #define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
>
> #define KASAN_FREE_PAGE 0xFF /* page was freed */
> +#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE 0xFE /* redzone for kmalloc_large allocations */
> +#define KASAN_SLAB_PADDING 0xFD /* Slab page padding, does not belong to any slub object */
> +#define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE 0xFC /* redzone inside slub object */
> +#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE 0xFB /* object was freed (kmem_cache_free/kfree) */
> #define KASAN_SHADOW_GAP 0xF9 /* address belongs to shadow memory */
>
> struct access_info {
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
> index 8ac3b6b..185d04c 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include <linux/kasan.h>
>
> #include "kasan.h"
> +#include "../slab.h"
>
> /* Shadow layout customization. */
> #define SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1
> @@ -54,10 +55,14 @@ static void print_error_description(struct access_info *info)
> shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
>
> switch (shadow_val) {
> + case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
> + case KASAN_SLAB_PADDING:
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
> case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
> bug_type = "out of bounds access";
> break;
> case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
> bug_type = "use after free";
> break;
> case KASAN_SHADOW_GAP:
> @@ -76,11 +81,31 @@ static void print_error_description(struct access_info *info)
> static void print_address_description(struct access_info *info)
> {
> struct page *page;
> + struct kmem_cache *cache;
> u8 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
>
> page = virt_to_head_page((void *)info->access_addr);
>
> switch (shadow_val) {
> + case KASAN_SLAB_PADDING:
> + cache = page->slab_cache;
> + slab_err(cache, page, "access to slab redzone");
> + dump_stack();
> + break;
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
> + case 1 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
> + if (PageSlab(page)) {
> + void *object;
> + void *slab_page = page_address(page);
> +
> + cache = page->slab_cache;
> + object = virt_to_obj(cache, slab_page,
> + (void *)info->access_addr);
> + object_err(cache, page, object, "kasan error");
> + break;
> + }
> + case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
> case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
> dump_page(page, "kasan error");
> dump_stack();
> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> index e03dd6f..4dcbc2d 100644
> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> @@ -789,6 +789,7 @@ void *kmalloc_order(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned int order)
> page = alloc_kmem_pages(flags, order);
> ret = page ? page_address(page) : NULL;
> kmemleak_alloc(ret, size, 1, flags);
> + kasan_kmalloc_large(ret, size);
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_order);
> @@ -973,8 +974,10 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
> if (p)
> ks = ksize(p);
>
> - if (ks >= new_size)
> + if (ks >= new_size) {
> + kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size);
> return (void *)p;
> + }
>
> ret = kmalloc_track_caller(new_size, flags);
> if (ret && p)
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 88ad8b8..6af95c0 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
> #include <linux/stacktrace.h>
> #include <linux/prefetch.h>
> #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
>
> #include <trace/events/kmem.h>
>
> @@ -469,10 +470,12 @@ static int disable_higher_order_debug;
>
> static inline void metadata_access_enable(void)
> {
> + kasan_disable_local();
> }
>
> static inline void metadata_access_disable(void)
> {
> + kasan_enable_local();
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -1242,11 +1245,13 @@ static inline void dec_slabs_node(struct kmem_cache *s, int node,
> static inline void kmalloc_large_node_hook(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
> {
> kmemleak_alloc(ptr, size, 1, flags);
> + kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size);
> }
>
> static inline void kfree_hook(const void *x)
> {
> kmemleak_free(x);
> + kasan_kfree_large(x);
> }
>
> static inline int slab_pre_alloc_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags)
> @@ -1264,11 +1269,13 @@ static inline void slab_post_alloc_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
> flags &= gfp_allowed_mask;
> kmemcheck_slab_alloc(s, flags, object, slab_ksize(s));
> kmemleak_alloc_recursive(object, s->object_size, 1, s->flags, flags);
> + kasan_slab_alloc(s, object);
> }
>
> static inline void slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
> {
> kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
> + kasan_slab_free(s, x);
>
> /*
> * Trouble is that we may no longer disable interrupts in the fast path
> @@ -1381,8 +1388,11 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> void *object)
> {
> setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
> - if (unlikely(s->ctor))
> + if (unlikely(s->ctor)) {
> + kasan_slab_alloc(s, object);
> s->ctor(object);
> + }
> + kasan_slab_free(s, object);
> }
>
> static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
> @@ -1419,8 +1429,10 @@ static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
> setup_object(s, page, p);
> if (likely(idx < page->objects))
> set_freepointer(s, p, p + s->size);
> - else
> + else {
> set_freepointer(s, p, NULL);
> + kasan_mark_slab_padding(s, p, page);
> + }
> }
>
> page->freelist = start;
> @@ -2491,6 +2503,7 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, size_t size)
> {
> void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_);
> trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, gfpflags);
> + kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_trace);
> @@ -2517,6 +2530,8 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
>
> trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
> size, s->size, gfpflags, node);
> +
> + kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace);
> @@ -2900,6 +2915,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
> init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
> init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
> #endif
> + kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node));
> init_kmem_cache_node(n);
> inc_slabs_node(kmem_cache_node, node, page->objects);
>
> @@ -3272,6 +3288,8 @@ void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
>
> trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, flags);
>
> + kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
> +
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc);
> @@ -3315,12 +3333,14 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
>
> trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, flags, node);
>
> + kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
> +
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node);
> #endif
>
> -size_t ksize(const void *object)
> +static size_t __ksize(const void *object)
> {
> struct page *page;
>
> @@ -3336,6 +3356,15 @@ size_t ksize(const void *object)
>
> return slab_ksize(page->slab_cache);
> }
> +
> +size_t ksize(const void *object)
> +{
> + size_t size = __ksize(object);
> + /* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
> + so we need unpoison this area. */
> + kasan_krealloc(object, size);
> + return size;
> +}
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
>
> void kfree(const void *x)
> --
> 2.1.3
>
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