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Date:	Thu, 22 Jan 2015 09:34:57 +0400
From:	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
To:	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
Cc:	Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
	Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@...gle.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>,
	Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@...il.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
	Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...il.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
	"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/17] Kernel address sanitizer - runtime memory debugger.

2015-01-22 3:22 GMT+03:00 Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>:
> On 01/21/2015 11:51 AM, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> Changes since v8:
>>       - Fixed unpoisoned redzones for not-allocated-yet object
>>           in newly allocated slab page. (from Dmitry C.)
>>
>>       - Some minor non-function cleanups in kasan internals.
>>
>>       - Added ack from Catalin
>>
>>       - Added stack instrumentation. With this we could detect
>>           out of bounds accesses in stack variables. (patch 12)
>>
>>       - Added globals instrumentation - catching out of bounds in
>>           global varibles. (patches 13-17)
>>
>>       - Shadow moved out from vmalloc into hole between vmemmap
>>           and %esp fixup stacks. For globals instrumentation
>>           we will need shadow backing modules addresses.
>>           So we need some sort of a shadow memory allocator
>>           (something like vmmemap_populate() function, except
>>           that it should be available after boot).
>>
>>           __vmalloc_node_range() suits that purpose, except that
>>           it can't be used for allocating for shadow in vmalloc
>>           area because shadow in vmalloc is already 'allocated'
>>           to protect us from other vmalloc users. So we need
>>           16TB of unused addresses. And we have big enough hole
>>           between vmemmap and %esp fixup stacks. So I moved shadow
>>           there.
>
> I'm not sure which new addition caused it, but I'm getting tons of
> false positives from platform drivers trying to access memory they
> don't "own" - because they expect to find hardware there.
>

To be sure, that this is really false positives, could you try with
patches in attachment?
That should fix some bugs in several platform drivers.

> I suspect we'd need to mark that memory region somehow to prevent
> accesses to it from triggering warnings?
>
>
> Thanks,
> Sasha
>

View attachment "backlight-da9052_bl-terminate-da9052_wled_ids-array-with-empty-element.patch" of type "text/x-patch" (414 bytes)

View attachment "crypto-ccp-terminate-ccp_support-array-with-empty-element.patch" of type "text/x-patch" (360 bytes)

View attachment "rtc-s5m-terminate-s5m_rtc_id-array-with-empty-element.patch" of type "text/x-patch" (419 bytes)

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