linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] apply: refuse touching a file beyond symlink

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Date:	Fri, 30 Jan 2015 13:11:53 -0500
From:	Jeff King <peff@...f.net>
To:	Junio C Hamano <gitster@...ox.com>
Cc:	Git Mailing List <git@...r.kernel.org>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...oraproject.org>,
	"Linux-Kernel@...r. Kernel. Org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	twaugh@...hat.com, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] apply: refuse touching a file beyond symlink

On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 12:45:22PM -0800, Junio C Hamano wrote:

> +static int path_is_beyond_symlink(const char *name_)
> +{
> +	struct strbuf name = STRBUF_INIT;
> +
> +	strbuf_addstr(&name, name_);
> +	do {
> +		struct patch *previous;
> +
> +		while (--name.len && name.buf[name.len] != '/')
> +			; /* scan backwards */
> +		if (!name.len)
> +			break;

I imagine it is impossible here for "name_" to be initially empty, but
it would make the backwards-scan loop go quite badly. Worth a comment or
an assert()?

> +		name.buf[name.len] = '\0';
> +		previous = in_fn_table(name.buf);
> +		if (previous) {
> +			if (!was_deleted(previous) &&
> +			    !to_be_deleted(previous) &&
> +			    previous->new_mode &&
> +			    S_ISLNK(previous->new_mode))
> +				goto symlink_found;
> +		} else if (check_index) {
> +			int pos = cache_name_pos(name.buf, name.len);
> +			if (0 <= pos &&
> +			    S_ISLNK(active_cache[pos]->ce_mode))
> +				goto symlink_found;
> +		} else {
> +			struct stat st;
> +			if (!lstat(name.buf, &st) && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
> +				goto symlink_found;
> +		}
> +	} while (1);
> +
> +	strbuf_release(&name);
> +	return 0;
> +symlink_found:
> +	strbuf_release(&name);
> +	return 1;

Style nit, but might this be easier to follow the logic without the
gotos, by putting the setup and cleanup in a wrapper function and
returning directly from the main logic?

  static int path_is_beyond_symlink(const char *name)
  {
	struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
	int ret;

	strbuf_addstr(&buf, name);
	ret = path_is_beyond_symlink_1(name);
	strbuf_release(&buf);

	return ret;
  }

I can live with it either way, though.

> +	if (!patch->is_delete && path_is_beyond_symlink(patch->new_name))
> +		return error(_("affected file '%s' is beyond a symbolic link"),
> +			     patch->new_name);

Why does this not kick in when deleting a file? If it is not OK to
add across a symlink, why is it OK to delete? IOW, why should this test
fail:

diff --git a/t/t4122-apply-symlink-inside.sh b/t/t4122-apply-symlink-inside.sh
index 0a8de4a..f03b604 100755
--- a/t/t4122-apply-symlink-inside.sh
+++ b/t/t4122-apply-symlink-inside.sh
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'do not follow symbolic link (setup)' '
 	>arch/x86_64/dir/file &&
 	git add arch/x86_64/dir/file &&
 	git diff HEAD >add_file.patch &&
+	git diff -R HEAD >del_file.patch &&
 	git reset --hard &&
 	rm -fr arch/x86_64/dir &&
 
@@ -111,7 +112,11 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'do not follow symbolic link (existing)' '
 
 	test_must_fail git apply --cached add_file.patch 2>error-ct-file &&
 	test_i18ngrep "beyond a symbolic link" error-ct-file &&
-	test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/i386/dir
+	test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/i386/dir &&
+
+	>arch/i386/dir/file &&
+	test_must_fail git apply del_file.patch &&
+	test_path_is_file arch/i386/dir/file
 '
 
 test_done

> +	test ! -e arch/x86_64/dir &&
> +	test ! -e arch/i386/dir/file &&

Minor nit: use test_path_is_missing here (and elsewhere in the added
tests).

-Peff
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