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Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 13:37:39 +1100
From: NeilBrown <neilb@...e.de>
To: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 10/20] security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware
Like ->follow_link, inode_follow_link now takes an inode and
flags as well as the dentry.
inode is used in preference to dentry->d_inode, particularly in
RCU-walk mode.
selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and
inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call
avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set.
Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means
that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt
to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not
actually drop the RCU read-lock.
However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed
region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@...e.de>
---
fs/namei.c | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 12 +++++++++---
security/capability.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 7 ++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 784fca0e6c70..6ac163212429 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -895,7 +895,8 @@ follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
touch_atime(link);
nd_set_link(NULL);
- error = security_inode_follow_link(dentry);
+ error = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, inode,
+ nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU);
if (error)
goto out_put_nd_path;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 237d22bfc642..5a207d110053 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @inode_follow_link:
* Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
* @dentry contains the dentry structure for the link.
+ * @inode contains dentry->d_inode, which itself is not stable in RCU-walk
+ * @flags contains LOOKUP_RCU if in RCU-walk mode.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @inode_permission:
* Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the
@@ -1551,7 +1553,8 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ int flags);
int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask);
int (*inode_setattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
int (*inode_getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -1838,7 +1841,8 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
unsigned int flags);
int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry);
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ int flags);
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -2240,7 +2244,9 @@ static inline int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
+static inline int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ int flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index ad8557782e73..f65bf2c26944 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -209,7 +209,8 @@ static int cap_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
return 0;
}
-static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
+static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ int flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7b4fd199e881..0ff6d38cf1e4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -581,11 +581,12 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry);
}
-int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ int flags)
{
- if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry);
+ return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, inode, flags);
}
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9a08b8c04eff..b46382749b33 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2862,11 +2862,26 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
-static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ int flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid;
- return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ validate_creds(cred);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
+ flags & LOOKUP_RCU ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
}
static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
--
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