linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 01/17] x86, fpu: wrap get_xsave

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Date:	Tue, 24 Mar 2015 17:20:09 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc:	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
	Suresh Siddha <sbsiddha@...il.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/17] x86, fpu: wrap get_xsave_addr() to make it safer

[add Borislav]

I swear it would actually be an improvement if we just randomized the
function names.  fpu_817, fpu_717, etc.  At least no one would think
they understand them...

On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 5:18 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 5:12 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>> On 03/24/2015 04:52 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>>>> On 03/24/2015 03:28 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>> Your function appears to be getting it for write (I assume that's what
>>>>> the unlazy_fpu is for), so I'd rather have it called
>>>>> tsk_get_xsave_field_for_write or something like that.
>>>>
>>>> It should be entirely read-only.
>>>>
>>>> For MPX (the only user of get_xsave_addr() iirc), we are only worried
>>>> about getting the status codes (and addresses) out of the bndstatus
>>>> register and making sure that the kernel-recorded bounds directory
>>>> address matches the bndcfgu (configuration) register.
>>>>
>>>> We don't ever write to the registers.
>>>
>>> So why are you unlazying it?
>>
>> Oleg actually suggested it.
>>
>>> IIUC, the xstae for current can be in one of three logical states:
>>>
>>> 1. Live in CPU regs.  The in-memory copy is garbage and the state is
>>> in CPU regs.
>>> 2. Lazy.  The in-memory copy and the CPU regs match.  Writing to
>>> either copy is illegal.
>>> 3. In memory only.  Writing to the in-memory copy is safe.
>>>
>>> IIUC, you want to read the xstate, do you're okay with #2 or #3.  This
>>> would be tsk_get_xsave_field_for_read in my terminology.
>>>
>>> If you want to write the xstate, you'd need to be in state #3, which
>>> would be tsk_get_xsave_field_for_write.
>>>
>>> IIUC, unlazy_fpu just moves from from state 2 to 3.
>>
>> I won't completely claim to understand what's going on with the FPU
>> code, but I think your analysis is a bit off.
>>
>> unlazy_fpu() does __save_init_fpu() which (among other things) calls
>> xsave to dump the CPU registers to memory.  That doesn't make any sense
>> to do if "The in-memory copy and the CPU regs match."
>>
>> IOW, unlazy_fpu() is called when the in-memory copy is garbage and takes
>> us to a state where we can look at the in-memory copy.
>
> I think that __save_init_fpu (called by unlazy_fpu) does that, but
> __thread_fpu_end calls __thread_clear_has_fpu, which, in turn, zaps
> fpu_owner_task, which will force an unnecessary xrstor.  Or maybe not
> if we have further bugs.
>
> Holy crap these functions are poorly named.  Also, what, if anything,
> guarantees that fpu_owner_task is set on entry to userspace?  Do we
> even need it to be set?  Oleg, help?
>
> --Andy
>
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