linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 00/12] [RFC] x86: Memory Protection Keys

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Date:	Thu, 07 May 2015 20:48:14 +0200
From:	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
To:	Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CC:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] [RFC] x86: Memory Protection Keys

On 05/07/2015 08:09 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 05/07/2015 10:57 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>>>> There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and
>>>> writing to the new register.  The feature is only available in
>>>> 64-bit mode, even though there is theoretically space in the PAE
>>>> PTEs.  These permissions are enforced on data access only and have
>>>> no effect on instruction fetches.
>> So I'm wondering what the primary usecases are for this feature?
>> Could you outline applications/workloads/libraries that would
>> benefit from this?
>
> There are lots of things that folks would _like_ to mprotect(), but end
> up not being feasible because of the overhead of going and mucking with
> thousands of PTEs and shooting down remote TLBs every time you want to
> change protections.
>
> Data structures like logs or journals that are only written to in very
> limited code paths, but that you want to protect from "stray" writes.
>
> Maybe even a database where a query operation will never need to write
> to memory, but an insert would.  You could keep the data R/O during the
> entire operation except when an insert is actually in progress.  It
> narrows the window where data might be corrupted.  This becomes even
> more valuable if a stray write to memory is guaranteed to hit storage...
> like with persistent memory.
>
> Someone mentioned to me that valgrind does lots of mprotect()s and might
> benefit from this.
>
> We could keep heap metadata as R/O and only make it R/W inside of
> malloc() itself to catch corruption more quickly.

But that metadata is typically within the same page as the data itself 
(for small objects at least), no?

> More crazy ideas welcome. :)

Since you asked :) I wonder if the usefulness could be extended by 
making it possible for a thread to revoke its access to WRPKRU (it's not 
privileged, right?). Then I could imagine some extra security for 
sandbox/bytecode/JIT code so it doesn't interfere with the runtime. But 
since it doesn't block instruction fetches, then maybe it wouldn't make 
much difference...

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