Date:	Fri, 31 Jul 2015 12:56:59 -0700
From:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:	Amir Goldstein <amir@...lrox.com>
Cc:	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	SELinux-NSA <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts

On 7/31/2015 1:11 AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 6:33 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 7/30/2015 7:47 AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Seth Forshee
>>> <seth.forshee@...onical.com> wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 07:24:11AM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:40 PM, Seth Forshee
>>>>> <seth.forshee@...onical.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 05:05:17PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>>>>> This is what I currently think you want for user ns mounts:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  1. smk_root and smk_default are assigned the label of the backing
>>>>>>>>     device.
>>>>> Seth,
>>>>>
>>>>> There were 2 main concerns discussed in this thread:
>>>>> 1. trusting LSM labels outside the namespace
>>>>> 2. trusting the content of the image file/loopdev
>>>>>
>>>>> While your approach addresses the first concern, I suspect it may be placing
>>>>> an obstacle in a way for resolving the second concern.
>>>>>
>>>>> A viable security policy to mitigate the second concern could be:
>>>>> - Allow only trusted programs (e.g. mkfs, fsck) to write to 'Loopback' images
>>>>> - Allow mount only of 'Loopback' images
>>>>>
>>>>> This should allow the system as a whole to trust unprivileged mounts based on
>>>>> the trust of the entities that had raw access the the fs layout.
>>>> You don't really say what you mean by "trusted" programs. In a container
>>>> context I'd have to assume that you mean suid-root or similar programs
>>>> shared into the container by the host. In that case is any new kernel
>>>> functionality even required?
>>> Sorry I was not clear. I will try to explain better.
>>> I meant that the programs are "trusted" by the LSM security policy.
>>> I envisioned a system where unprivileged user is allowed to spawn
>>> a container which contains "trusted" programs (e.g. mkfs) that are labeled
>>> as 'FileSystemTools' by the admin of the host.
>>> FileSystemTools are allowed to write into Loopback labeled files.
>> You could do this on a Smack based system. It would require
>> CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to set up. You would need
>> to set some SMACK64EXEC labels on your FileSystemTools, and
>> they would have to be written as carefully as the would if they
>> had "more" privilege. You'd need to designate a repository for
>> your loopback files. On the whole, it would be unattractive.
>> I will pass on providing the details for fear someone will like
>> it well enough to implement.
>>
>>>> That also doesn't work for some of our use cases, where we'd like to be
>>>> able to do something like "mount -o loop foo.img /mnt/foo" in an
>>>> unprivileged container where foo.img is not created on the local machine
>>>> and not fully under control of the host environment.
>>> That use case will not be addressed by the policy I suggested,
>>> but the more common case of:
>>> - create a loopback file
>>> - mkfs
>>> - mount
>>> will be addressed.
>>>
>>> So if the (host) admin of the system trusts that unprivileged user cannot create
>>> a malicious fs layout using mkfs and fsck alone, then the system is
>>> relatively safe
>>> mounting (non fuse) file systems from loopback files.
>>> IMHO, this statement is going to be easier for Ted to sign.
>> But that sort of defeats the purpose of unprivileged mounts.
>> Or rather, you're trying to place restrictions on what an
>> unprivileged user can do without calling the ability to
>> violate those restrictions "privilege".
> I don't understand your concern.

My concern is that you're playing a shell game. Allow unprivileged
mounts, but only of things that where created using privilege. How
is that better than requiring privilege to do the mount?

> I am saying that LSM can come to the rescue, in a use case that
> many have been considering as unsolvable (i.e. the loopback tampering).
>
> Yes, I am trying to place restrictions on what an unprivileged user can do.
> As it stands right now, user is about to gain the ability to mount FUSE.
> With some extra care on crafting the policy and without any extra code,
> user can gain the ability to mount "trusted loopback files".
> It does not solve all use cases, but it does solve a handful.

As I said, you can do this, but it will be ugly, and people won't
understand how to use it correctly. The distance between the "trusted"
creation of the filesystem and the "untrusted" mount is too great.
Plus, there are too many ways to circumvent the integrity of your
"trusted" filesystem.

> Anyway, the concern I was raising was about the fact that if files inside
> the loopback mount inherit the label of the loopback file, this policy is
> going to be impossible to write.
> But Stephan has already proposed an alternative to this implicit inherit rule
> on [PATCH 6/7] thread, so I withdraw my concern.

What Stephan has proposed is dandy for SELinux.

>
>
>>>> Agreed though that the "attack from below" problem for untrusted
>>>> filesystems is still an open question. At minimum we have fuse, which
>>>> has been designed to protect against this threat. Others have mentioned
>>>> on this thread that Ted had said something at kernel summit last year
>>>> about being willing to support ext4 mounts from unprivileged user
>>>> namespaces as well. I've added Ted to the Cc in case he wants to confirm
>>>> or deny this rumor.
>>>>
>>>>> Alas, if you choose to propagate the backing dev label to contained files,
>>>>> they would all share the designated 'Loopback' label and render the policy above
>>>>> useless.
>>>>>
>>>>> Any thoughts on how to reconcile this conflict?
>>>> I'm not seeing what the conflict is here - nothing you proposed says
>>>> anything about security labels in the filesystem, and nothing would
>>>> prevent a "trusted" program with CAP_MAC_ADMIN from setting whatever
>>>> label was desired on the backing device. Care to elaborate?
>>>>
>>>> Seth

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