linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] fs: clear file set[ug]id when writing via mmap

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Date:	Mon, 23 Nov 2015 13:26:24 +0100
From:	Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@...ux.intel.com>,
	Shachar Raindel <raindel@...lanox.com>,
	Boaz Harrosh <boaz@...xistor.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.cz>,
	Haggai Eran <haggaie@...lanox.com>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@...gle.com>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
	Dirk Steinmetz <public@...tdrjgfuzkfg.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: clear file set[ug]id when writing via mmap

On Thu 19-11-15 16:10:43, Kees Cook wrote:
> Normally, when a user can modify a file that has setuid or setgid bits,
> those bits are cleared when they are not the file owner or a member of the
> group. This is enforced when using write() directly but not when writing
> to a shared mmap on the file. This could allow the file writer to gain
> privileges by changing the binary without losing the setuid/setgid bits.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org

So I had another look at this and now I understand why we didn't do it from
the start:

To call file_remove_privs() safely, we need to hold inode->i_mutex since
that operations is going to modify file mode / extended attributes and
i_mutex protects those. However we cannot get i_mutex in the page fault
path as that ranks above mmap_sem which we hold during the whole page
fault.

So calling file_remove_privs() when opening the file is probably as good as
it can get. It doesn't catch the case when suid bits / IMA attrs are set
while the file is already open but I don't see easy way around this.

BTW: This is another example where page fault locking is constraining us
and life would be simpler for filesystems we they get called without
mmap_sem held...

								Honza
-- 
Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
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