linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] staging: gdm72xx: add userspace data struct

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Fri, 11 Dec 2015 00:17:20 +0000
From:	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To:	Wim de With <nauxuron@...dewith.com>
Cc:	gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, devel@...verdev.osuosl.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] staging: gdm72xx: add userspace data struct

On Fri, 11 Dec 2015 00:47:38 +0100
Wim de With <nauxuron@...dewith.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 02:44:45PM +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> > (except that you mean sizeof(struct fsm_s) and it doesn't compile at the
> > moment!
> 
> Oops, sloppy mistake.

Compile/test/send - even when in a hurry

> > data_s can just be modified to be __user. All uses of it follow that
> > rule.
> 
> What do you mean? The data still needs to be copied from user space to kernel
> space, if I'm not mistaken. And not all uses follow that rule, since in both
> gdm_wimax_ioctl_get_data() and gdm_wimax_ioctl_set_data() it is used as both
> the source and destination in the copy_from_user() and copy_to_user() call.

Good point I missed that.

> > All I think you need in this case is
> > 
> > 	struct fsm_s fsm_buf;
> > 
> > 	if (copy_from_user(&fsm_buf, req->data.buf,sizeof(buf))
> > 		return -EFAULT
> > 	gdm_update_fsm(&fsm_buf);
> 
> Do you mean sizeof(fsm_s)? I realize this would have been far simpler than my
> overkill solution.

Yes either sizeof(struct fsm_s) or sizeof(fsm_buf). The former is often
safer.

> > If you are touching the structs it might be wise to fix the other
> > problems with them notably the use of int. sizes when used are unsigned -
> > and signed sizes are asking for errors. In fact if you look at the
> > existing uses of the size checks they look deeply suspicious the moment
> > anything malicious passes in negative numbers.
> 
> I would love to do that, but it is a bit outside the scope of this patch, so I
> would rather safe this for another patch.

Absolutely right - it should be another patch

Alan
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/