lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Thu, 25 Feb 2016 17:18:14 -0700
From:	Linn Crosetto <linn@....com>
To:	matt@...eblueprint.co.uk, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
	roy.franz@...aro.org, mingo@...nel.org, mark.rutland@....com
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Linn Crosetto <linn@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64/efi: report unexpected errors when determining Secure Boot status

Certain code in the boot path may require the ability to determine whether
UEFI Secure Boot is definitely enabled, for example printing status to the
console. Other code may need to know when UEFI Secure Boot is definitely
disabled, for example restricting use of kernel parameters.

If an unexpected error is returned from GetVariable when querying the
status of UEFI Secure Boot, return an error to the caller. This allows the
caller to determine the definite state, and to take appropriate action if
an expected error is returned.

Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@....com>
---
New patch in v2 based on feedback from v1:

 - Maintain existing behavior to allow 'dtb=' parameter only when UEFI
   Secure Boot is disabled and not in an unknown state. (Mark Rutland)

 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
index 3397902..b1bb133 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 #include "efistub.h"
 
-static int efi_secureboot_enabled(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
 {
 	static efi_guid_t const var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
 	static efi_char16_t const var_name[] = {
@@ -37,8 +37,12 @@ static int efi_secureboot_enabled(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
 		return val;
 	case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
 		return 0;
+	case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
+		return -EIO;
+	case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
+		return -EACCES;
 	default:
-		return 1;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -183,6 +187,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
 	efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
 	unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
 	unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
+	int secure_boot = 0;
 
 	/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
 	if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
@@ -231,13 +236,15 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
 
+	secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
+	if (secure_boot > 0)
+		pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
+
 	/*
 	 * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
 	 * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
 	 */
-	if (efi_secureboot_enabled(sys_table)) {
-		pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-	} else {
+	if (secure_boot == 0) {
 		status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
 					      "dtb=",
 					      ~0UL, &fdt_addr, &fdt_size);
-- 
2.1.4

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ