linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/4] signals/sigaltstack: If SS_AUTODISARM, bypass on_sig

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Date:	Sun, 8 May 2016 18:32:46 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>
Cc:	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Shuah Khan <shuahkh@....samsung.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Jason Low <jason.low2@...com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
	Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Amanieu d'Antras" <amanieu@...il.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru>,
	Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@....de>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
	Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
	Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...allels.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] signals/sigaltstack: If SS_AUTODISARM, bypass on_sig_stack

On May 7, 2016 7:38 AM, "Stas Sergeev" <stsp@...t.ru> wrote:
>
> 03.05.2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski пишет:
>
>> If a signal stack is set up with SS_AUTODISARM, then the kernel
>> inherently avoids incorrectly resetting the signal stack if signals
>> recurse: the signal stack will be reset on the first signal
>> delivery.  This means that we don't need check the stack pointer
>> when delivering signals if SS_AUTODISARM is set.
>>
>> This will make segmented x86 programs more robust: currently there's
>> a hole that could be triggered if ESP/RSP appears to point to the
>> signal stack but actually doesn't due to a nonzero SS base.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>
>> Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
>> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
>> Cc: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@...il.com>
>> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
>> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
>> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>
>> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
>> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>
>> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
>> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@....de>
>> Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@...com>
>> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>
>> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru>
>> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
>> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>
>> Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
>> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
>> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
>> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
>> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
>> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@....samsung.com>
>> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
>> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...allels.com>
>> Cc: linux-api@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
>> ---
>>   include/linux/sched.h | 12 ++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
>> index 2950c5cd3005..8f03a93348b9 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
>> @@ -2576,6 +2576,18 @@ static inline int kill_cad_pid(int sig, int priv)
>>    */
>>   static inline int on_sig_stack(unsigned long sp)
>>   {
>> +       /*
>> +        * If the signal stack is AUTODISARM then, by construction, we
>> +        * can't be on the signal stack unless user code deliberately set
>> +        * SS_AUTODISARM when we were already on the it.
>
> "on the it" -> "on it".
>
> Anyway, I am a bit puzzled with this patch.
> You say "unless user code deliberately set
>
> SS_AUTODISARM when we were already on the it"
> so what happens in case it actually does?
>

Stack corruption.  Don't do that.

> Without your patch: if user sets up the same sas - no stack switch.
> if user sets up different sas - stack switch on nested signal.
>
> With your patch: stack switch in any case, so if user
> set up same sas - stack corruption by nested signal.
>
> Or am I missing the intention?

The intention is to make everything completely explicit.  With
SS_AUTODISARM, the kernel knows directly whether you're on the signal
stack, and there should be no need to look at sp.  If you set
SS_AUTODISARM and get a signal, the signal stack gets disarmed.  If
you take a nested signal, it's delivered normally.  When you return
all the way out, the signal stack is re-armed.

For DOSEMU, this means that no 16-bit register state can possibly
cause a signal to be delivered wrong, because the register state when
a signal is raised won't affect delivery, which seems like a good
thing to me.

If this behavior would be problematic for you, can you explain why?