linux-kernel - [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/mm: PUD VA support for physical mapping (x86

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Date:	Wed, 25 May 2016 15:57:33 -0700
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
	Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@....com>, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@...il.com>,
	Alexander Popov <alpopov@...ecurity.com>,
	Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
	Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@...el.com>,
	Mark Salter <msalter@...hat.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
	Jan Beulich <JBeulich@...e.com>,
	Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
	Seth Jennings <sjennings@...iantweb.net>,
	Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/mm: PUD VA support for physical mapping (x86_64)

From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>

Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
addresses. The current implementation expects the virtual address to be
PUD aligned. For KASLR memory randomization, we need to be able to
randomize the offset used on the PUD table.

It has no impact on current usage.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index bce2e5d9edd4..f205f39bd808 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -454,10 +454,10 @@ phys_pud_init(pud_t *pud_page, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 {
 	unsigned long pages = 0, next;
 	unsigned long last_map_addr = end;
-	int i = pud_index(addr);
+	int i = pud_index((unsigned long)__va(addr));
 
 	for (; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++, addr = next) {
-		pud_t *pud = pud_page + pud_index(addr);
+		pud_t *pud = pud_page + pud_index((unsigned long)__va(addr));
 		pmd_t *pmd;
 		pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
 
-- 
2.6.3