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Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 12:37:31 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: nix@...eri.org.uk
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
fweimer@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [4.1.x -- 4.6.x and probably HEAD] Reproducible unprivileged
panic/TLB BUG on sparc via a stack-protected rt_sigaction() ka_restorer,
courtesy of the glibc testsuite
From: Nick Alcock <nix@...eri.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 14:19:27 +0100
> The only difference between the two series above is that in the crashing
> series, the ka_restorer stub functions __rt_sigreturn_stub and
> __sigreturn_stub (on sparc32) and __rt_sigreturn_stub (on sparc64) get
> stack-protected; in the non-crashing series, they do not; the same is
> true without --enable-stack-protector=all, because the functions have no
> local variables at all, so without -fstack-protector-all they don't get
> stack-protected in any case. Passing such a stack-protected function in
> as the ka_restorer stub seems to suffice to cause this crash at some
> later date. I'm wondering if the stack canary is clobbering something
> that the caller does not expect to be clobbered: we saw this cause
> trouble on x86 in a different context (see upstream commit
> 7a25d6a84df9fea56963569ceccaaf7c2a88f161).
This is amazing that it makes a difference since the sigreturn stub is
implemented entirely in inline assembler :-)
Normally the 64-bit stub is emitted as:
__rt_sigreturn_stub:
mov 101, %g1
ta 0x6d
and with -fstack-protector-all we get:
__rt_sigreturn_stub:
save %sp, -192, %sp
ldx [%g7+40], %g1
stx %g1, [%fp+2039]
mov 0, %g1
mov 101, %g1
ta 0x6d
ldx [%fp+2039], %g1
ldx [%g7+40], %g2
xor %g1, %g2, %g1
mov 0, %g2
brnz,pn %g1, .LL4
nop
return %i7+8
nop
.LL4:
call __stack_chk_fail, 0
nop
nop
That 'save' is the problem.
One can't change the register window or the stack pointer in this
function, as the kernel has setup the restore frame at a precise
location relative to the stack pointer when the stub is invoked.
Basically, do_rt_sigreturn is restoring garbage into the cpu
registers.
It obviously shouldn't crash, which I'll look into, but it is clear
that we can't enable -fstack-protector-all for this function.
So far I'm playing with the patch below to do some basic sanity
checks on the values inside of the sigreturn frame:
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
index 3c25241..6eb39a7 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
@@ -138,6 +138,18 @@ int copy_siginfo_from_user32(siginfo_t *to, compat_siginfo_t __user *from)
return 0;
}
+/* Checks if the fp is valid. We always build signal frames which are
+ * 16-byte aligned, therefore we can always enforce that the restore
+ * frame has that property as well.
+ */
+static bool invalid_frame_pointer(void __user *fp, int fplen)
+{
+ if ((((unsigned long) fp) & 15) ||
+ ((unsigned long)fp) > 0x100000000ULL - fplen)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
void do_sigreturn32(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct signal_frame32 __user *sf;
@@ -158,8 +170,10 @@ void do_sigreturn32(struct pt_regs *regs)
sf = (struct signal_frame32 __user *) regs->u_regs[UREG_FP];
/* 1. Make sure we are not getting garbage from the user */
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, sf, sizeof(*sf)) ||
- (((unsigned long) sf) & 3))
+ if (invalid_frame_pointer(sf, sizeof(*sf)))
+ goto segv;
+
+ if (sf->info.si_regs.u_regs[UREG_FP] & 3)
goto segv;
if (get_user(pc, &sf->info.si_regs.pc) ||
@@ -242,8 +256,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_rt_sigreturn32(struct pt_regs *regs)
sf = (struct rt_signal_frame32 __user *) regs->u_regs[UREG_FP];
/* 1. Make sure we are not getting garbage from the user */
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, sf, sizeof(*sf)) ||
- (((unsigned long) sf) & 3))
+ if (invalid_frame_pointer(sf, sizeof(*sf)))
+ goto segv;
+
+ if (sf->regs.u_regs[UREG_FP] & 3)
goto segv;
if (get_user(pc, &sf->regs.pc) ||
@@ -307,14 +323,6 @@ segv:
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
}
-/* Checks if the fp is valid */
-static int invalid_frame_pointer(void __user *fp, int fplen)
-{
- if ((((unsigned long) fp) & 7) || ((unsigned long)fp) > 0x100000000ULL - fplen)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long framesize)
{
unsigned long sp;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
index 39aaec1..a8f0019 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -234,6 +234,17 @@ do_sigsegv:
goto out;
}
+/* Checks if the fp is valid. We always build rt signal frames which
+ * are 16-byte aligned, therefore we can always enforce that the
+ * restore frame has that property as well.
+ */
+static bool invalid_frame_pointer(void __user *fp)
+{
+ if (((unsigned long) fp) & 15)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
struct rt_signal_frame {
struct sparc_stackf ss;
siginfo_t info;
@@ -261,7 +272,10 @@ void do_rt_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
(regs->u_regs [UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS);
/* 1. Make sure we are not getting garbage from the user */
- if (((unsigned long) sf) & 3)
+ if (invalid_frame_pointer(sf))
+ goto segv;
+
+ if ((sf->regs.u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS) & 7)
goto segv;
err = get_user(tpc, &sf->regs.tpc);
@@ -308,14 +322,6 @@ segv:
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
}
-/* Checks if the fp is valid */
-static int invalid_frame_pointer(void __user *fp)
-{
- if (((unsigned long) fp) & 15)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long framesize)
{
unsigned long sp = regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS;
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