linux-kernel - Re: [CRIU] Introspecting userns relationships to other namespaces?

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Date:	Thu, 7 Jul 2016 20:00:56 -0700
From:	Andrew Vagin <avagin@...tuozzo.com>
To:	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
CC:	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
	Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <criu@...nvz.org>,
	<mtk.manpages@...il.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: Re: [CRIU] Introspecting userns relationships to other namespaces?

On Thu, Jul 07, 2016 at 07:16:18PM -0700, Andrew Vagin wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 07, 2016 at 12:17:35PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Thu, 2016-07-07 at 20:21 +0200, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
> > > On 7 July 2016 at 17:01, James Bottomley
> > > <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com> wrote:
> > [Serge already answered the parenting issue]
> > > > On Thu, 2016-07-07 at 08:36 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > > Hm.  Probably best-effort based on the process hierarchy.  So 
> > > > > yeah you could probably get a tree into a state that would be 
> > > > > wrongly recreated. Create a new netns, bind mount it, exit;  Have 
> > > > > another task create a new user_ns, bind mount it, exit;  Third 
> > > > > task setns()s first to the new netns then to the new user_ns.  I 
> > > > > suspect criu will recreate that wrongly.
> > > > 
> > > > This is a bit pathological, and you have to be root to do it: so 
> > > > root can set up a nesting hierarchy, bind it and destroy the pids 
> > > > but I know of no current orchestration system which does this.
> > > > 
> > > > Actually, I have to back pedal a bit: the way I currently set up
> > > > architecture emulation containers does precisely this: I set up the
> > > > namespaces unprivileged with child mount namespaces, but then I ask
> > > > root to bind the userns and kill the process that created it so I 
> > > > have a permanent handle to enter the namespace by, so I suspect 
> > > > that when our current orchestration systems get more sophisticated, 
> > > > they might eventually want to do something like this as well.
> > > > 
> > > > In theory, we could get nsfs to show this information as an option
> > > > (just add a show_options entry to the superblock ops), but the 
> > > > problem is that although each namespace has a parent user_ns, 
> > > > there's no way to get it without digging in the namespace specific 
> > > > structure.  Probably we should restructure to move it into 
> > > > ns_common, then we could display it (and enforce all namespaces 
> > > > having owning user_ns) but it would be a
> > > 
> > > I'm missing something here. Is it not already the case that all
> > > namespaces have an owning user_ns?
> > 
> > Um, yes, I don't believe I said they don't.  The problem I thought you
> > were having is that there's no way of seeing what it is.
> > 
> > nsfs is the Namespace fileystem where bound namespaces appear to a cat
> > of /proc/self/mounts.  It can display any information that's in
> > ns_common (the common core of namespaces) but the owning user_ns
> > pointer currently isn't in this structure.  Every user namespace has a
> > pointer to it, but they're all privately embedded in the individual
> > namespace specific structures.  What I was proposing was that since
> > every current namespace has a pointer somewhere to the owning user
> > namespace, we could abstract this out into ns_common so it's now
> > accessible to be displayed by nsfs, probably as a mount option.
> 
> James, I am not sure that I understood you correctly. We have one
> file system for all namespace files, how we can show per-file properties
> in mount options. I think we can show all required information in
> fdinfo. We open a namespaces file (/proc/pid/ns/N) and then read
> /proc/pid/fdinfo/X for it.

Here is a proof-of-concept patch.

How it works:

In [1]: import os

In [2]: fd = os.open("/proc/self/ns/pid", os.O_RDONLY)

In [3]: print open("/proc/self/fdinfo/%d" % fd).read()
pos:	0
flags:	0100000
mnt_id:	2
userns: 4026531837

In [4]: print "/proc/self/ns/user -> %s" % os.readlink("/proc/self/ns/user")
/proc/self/ns/user -> user:[4026531837]

> 
> > 
> > James
> > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > CRIU mailing list
> > CRIU@...nvz.org
> > https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/criu
> _______________________________________________
> CRIU mailing list
> CRIU@...nvz.org
> https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/criu

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