linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] mm: add LSM hook for writes to readonly memory

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Thu, 29 Sep 2016 01:44:04 +0200
From:   Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:     "security@...nel.org" <security@...nel.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
        Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@...gle.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] mm: add LSM hook for writes to readonly memory

On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 01:32:56AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 04:22:53PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 3:54 PM, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net> wrote:
> > > SELinux attempts to make it possible to whitelist trustworthy sources of
> > > code that may be mapped into memory, and Android makes use of this feature.
> > > To prevent an attacker from bypassing this by modifying R+X memory through
> > > /proc/$pid/mem or PTRACE_POKETEXT, it is necessary to call a security hook
> > > in check_vma_flags().
> > 
> > If selinux policy allows PTRACE_POKETEXT, is it really so bad for that
> > to result in code execution?
> 
> Have a look at __ptrace_may_access():
> 
> 	/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
> 	if (same_thread_group(task, current))
> 		return 0;
> 
> This means thread A can attach to thread B and poke its memory, and SELinux
> can't do anything about it.
> 
> I guess another perspective on this would be that it's a problem that
> interfaces usable for poking user memory are subject to introspection rules
> (as opposed to e.g. /proc/self/maps, where it is actually useful).

Ugh, I'm talking nonsense, ptrace() doesn't work on threads. (/proc/$pid/mem
works though). And then, ptrace-ish APIs aside, there are those weird
devices that do DMA with force=1.

Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (820 bytes)