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Date:   Wed, 16 Nov 2016 13:22:36 -0600
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
CC:     <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        <x86@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early
 encryption/decryption of memory

On 11/16/2016 4:46 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> Btw, for your next submission, this patch can be split in two exactly
> like the commit message paragraphs are:

I think I originally had it that way, I don't know why I combined them.
I'll split them out.

> 
> On Wed, Nov 09, 2016 at 06:36:10PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
>> the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
>> encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
>> an encrypted or un-encrypted memory area is in the proper state (for
>> example the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
>> encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
> 
> Patch 2: users of the new memmap change
> 
>> The early_memmap support is enhanced to specify encrypted and un-encrypted
>> mappings with and without write-protection. The use of write-protection is
>> necessary when encrypting data "in place". The write-protect attribute is
>> considered cacheable for loads, but not stores. This implies that the
>> hardware will never give the core a dirty line with this memtype.
> 
> Patch 1: change memmap
> 
> This makes this aspect of the patchset much clearer and is better for
> bisection.
> 
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h        |    9 +++
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h   |   15 +++++
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |    8 +++
>>  arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c                |   28 +++++++++
>>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c            |  102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h  |    2 +
>>  mm/early_ioremap.c                   |   15 +++++
>>  7 files changed, 179 insertions(+)
> 
> ...
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> index d642cc5..06235b4 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
>>  #include <linux/init.h>
>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>>  
>> +#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>> +#include <asm/fixmap.h>
>> +
>>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>>  
>>  /*
>> @@ -24,6 +27,105 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>>  unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
>>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
>>  
>> +/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
>> +static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
>> + * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
>> + * meant to be accessed as encrypted but the contents are currently not
>> + * encrypted.
>> + */
>> +void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	void *src, *dst;
>> +	size_t len;
>> +
>> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	local_flush_tlb();
>> +	wbinvd();
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most)
>> +	 * one page at time.
>> +	 */
>> +	while (size) {
>> +		len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
>> +
>> +		/* Create a mapping for non-encrypted write-protected memory */
>> +		src = early_memremap_dec_wp(paddr, len);
>> +
>> +		/* Create a mapping for encrypted memory */
>> +		dst = early_memremap_enc(paddr, len);
>> +
>> +		/*
>> +		 * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the encryption,
>> +		 * then encrypted access to that area will end up causing
>> +		 * a crash.
>> +		 */
>> +		BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
>> +
>> +		memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
>> +		memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
> 
> I still am missing the short explanation why we need the temporary buffer.

Ok, I'll add that.

> 
> 
> Oh, and we can save us the code duplication a little. Diff ontop of yours:

Yup, makes sense.  I'll incorporate this.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index 06235b477d7c..50e2c4fc7338 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>   * meant to be accessed as encrypted but the contents are currently not
>   * encrypted.
>   */
> -void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
> +static void __init noinline
> +__mem_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)
>  {
>  	void *src, *dst;
>  	size_t len;
> @@ -54,15 +55,15 @@ void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>  	while (size) {
>  		len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
>  
> -		/* Create a mapping for non-encrypted write-protected memory */
> -		src = early_memremap_dec_wp(paddr, len);
> +		src = (enc ? early_memremap_dec_wp(paddr, len)
> +			   : early_memremap_enc_wp(paddr, len));
>  
> -		/* Create a mapping for encrypted memory */
> -		dst = early_memremap_enc(paddr, len);
> +		dst = (enc ? early_memremap_enc(paddr, len)
> +			   : early_memremap_dec(paddr, len));
>  
>  		/*
> -		 * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the encryption,
> -		 * then encrypted access to that area will end up causing
> +		 * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the dec/encryption,
> +		 * then (un-)encrypted access to that area will end up causing
>  		 * a crash.
>  		 */
>  		BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
> @@ -78,52 +79,14 @@ void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> -/*
> - * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
> - * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
> - * meant to be accessed as not encrypted but the contents are currently
> - * encrypted.
> - */
> -void __init sme_early_mem_dec(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
> +void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>  {
> -	void *src, *dst;
> -	size_t len;
> -
> -	if (!sme_me_mask)
> -		return;
> -
> -	local_flush_tlb();
> -	wbinvd();
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most)
> -	 * one page at time.
> -	 */
> -	while (size) {
> -		len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
> -
> -		/* Create a mapping for encrypted write-protected memory */
> -		src = early_memremap_enc_wp(paddr, len);
> -
> -		/* Create a mapping for non-encrypted memory */
> -		dst = early_memremap_dec(paddr, len);
> -
> -		/*
> -		 * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the decryption,
> -		 * then un-encrypted access to that area will end up causing
> -		 * a crash.
> -		 */
> -		BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
> -
> -		memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
> -		memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
> -
> -		early_memunmap(dst, len);
> -		early_memunmap(src, len);
> +	return __mem_enc_dec(paddr, size, true);
> +}
>  
> -		paddr += len;
> -		size -= len;
> -	}
> +void __init sme_early_mem_dec(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	return __mem_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
>  }
>  
>  void __init sme_early_init(void)
> 

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