Date:   Sat, 10 Dec 2016 13:37:25 +0100
From:   Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        rusty@...tcorp.com.au, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com>,
        "Daniel J . Bernstein" <djb@...yp.to>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] siphash: add cryptographically secure
 hashtable function

On Fri, Dec 09, 2016 at 07:36:59PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
> cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
> and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function.
> 
> SipHash isn't just some new trendy hash function. It's been around for a
> while, and there really isn't anything that comes remotely close to
> being useful in the way SipHash is. With that said, why do we need this?
> 
> There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
> attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
> same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
> a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector.
> 
> Linux developers already seem to be aware that this is an issue, and
> various places that use hash tables in, say, a network context, use a
> non-cryptographically secure function (usually jhash) and then try to
> twiddle with the key on a time basis (or in many cases just do nothing
> and hope that nobody notices). While this is an admirable attempt at
> solving the problem, it doesn't actually fix it. SipHash fixes it.
> 
> (It fixes it in such a sound way that you could even build a stream
> cipher out of SipHash that would resist the modern cryptanalysis.)
> 
> There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
> hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
> vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
> moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
> getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
> we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
> 
> Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
> tables. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels. SipHash is
> a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known problem, and it's
> time we catch-up.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
> Cc: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com>
> Cc: Daniel J. Bernstein <djb@...yp.to>
> ---
>  include/linux/siphash.h |  18 ++++++
>  lib/Makefile            |   3 +-
>  lib/siphash.c           | 163 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/siphash.h
>  create mode 100644 lib/siphash.c

This looks really nice, but we don't usually add stuff into lib/ unless
there is an actual user of the code :)

Have you tried converting any of the existing hash users to use this
instead?  If you did that, and it shows a solution for the known
problems with our existing hashes (as you point out above), I doubt
there would be any objection for this patch at all.

Minor coding style nits below:

> @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
> +/* Copyright (C) 2016 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
> + *
> + * SipHash: a fast short-input PRF
> + * https://131002.net/siphash/
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _LINUX_SIPHASH_H
> +#define _LINUX_SIPHASH_H
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +enum siphash24_lengths {
> +	SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN = 16
> +};
> +
> +uint64_t siphash24(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, const uint8_t key[SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN]);

Please use u64 and u8 instead of the userspace uint64_t and uint8_t
types for kernel code.  Yes, the ship has probably sailed for trying to
strictly enforce it, but it's a good idea to do where ever possible.

> +
> +#endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
> diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
> index 50144a3aeebd..d224337b0d01 100644
> --- a/lib/Makefile
> +++ b/lib/Makefile
> @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
>  	 sha1.o chacha20.o md5.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \
>  	 flex_proportions.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
>  	 is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
> -	 earlycpio.o seq_buf.o nmi_backtrace.o nodemask.o win_minmax.o
> +	 earlycpio.o seq_buf.o siphash.o \
> +	 nmi_backtrace.o nodemask.o win_minmax.o
>  
>  lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
>  lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
> diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..022d86f04b9b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/lib/siphash.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
> +/* Copyright (C) 2015-2016 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
> + * Copyright (C) 2012-2014 Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com>
> + * Copyright (C) 2012-2014 Daniel J. Bernstein <djb@...yp.to>
> + *
> + * SipHash: a fast short-input PRF
> + * https://131002.net/siphash/
> + */

Any specific license for this code?  It's good to at the least say what
it is.  Yes, we know it will default to GPLv2 only as part of the whole
kernel tree, but it's good to be explicit for when someone wants to copy
this code for their own projects...

> +
> +#include <linux/siphash.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/string.h>
> +
> +#define ROTL(x,b) (uint64_t)(((x) << (b)) | ((x) >> (64 - (b))))

Don't we have this in kernel.h somewhere?  Ah, yeah, it's rol64() in
bitops.h, no need to define it again please.

> +#define U8TO64(p) le64_to_cpu(*(__le64 *)(p))

Why the crazy casting behind a macro?

> +
> +#define SIPROUND \
> +	do { \
> +	v0 += v1; v1 = ROTL(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = ROTL(v0, 32); \
> +	v2 += v3; v3 = ROTL(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
> +	v0 += v3; v3 = ROTL(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
> +	v2 += v1; v1 = ROTL(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = ROTL(v2, 32); \
> +	} while(0)
> +
> +__attribute__((optimize("unroll-loops")))

Care to document why this attribute is needed?  Older versions of gcc
doesn't know how to handle it properly?  Faster with newer versions?
Black magic?  :)

> +uint64_t siphash24(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, const uint8_t key[SIPHASH24_KEY_LEN])
> +{
> +	uint64_t v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL;

s/uint64_t/u64/g please.


> +	uint64_t v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL;
> +	uint64_t v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL;
> +	uint64_t v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL;
> +	uint64_t b;
> +	uint64_t k0 = U8TO64(key);
> +	uint64_t k1 = U8TO64(key + sizeof(uint64_t));
> +	uint64_t m;
> +	const uint8_t *end = data + len - (len % sizeof(uint64_t));
> +	const uint8_t left = len & (sizeof(uint64_t) - 1);
> +	b = ((uint64_t)len) << 56;
> +	v3 ^= k1;
> +	v2 ^= k0;
> +	v1 ^= k1;
> +	v0 ^= k0;
> +	for (; data != end; data += sizeof(uint64_t)) {
> +		m = U8TO64(data);
> +		v3 ^= m;
> +		SIPROUND;
> +		SIPROUND;
> +		v0 ^= m;
> +	}
> +	switch (left) {
> +		case 7: b |= ((uint64_t)data[6]) << 48;
> +		case 6: b |= ((uint64_t)data[5]) << 40;
> +		case 5: b |= ((uint64_t)data[4]) << 32;
> +		case 4: b |= ((uint64_t)data[3]) << 24;
> +		case 3: b |= ((uint64_t)data[2]) << 16;
> +		case 2: b |= ((uint64_t)data[1]) <<  8;
> +		case 1: b |= ((uint64_t)data[0]); break;
> +		case 0: break;
> +	}
> +	v3 ^= b;
> +	SIPROUND;
> +	SIPROUND;
> +	v0 ^= b;
> +	v2 ^= 0xff;
> +	SIPROUND;
> +	SIPROUND;
> +	SIPROUND;
> +	SIPROUND;
> +	b = (v0 ^ v1) ^ (v2 ^ v3);
> +	return (__force uint64_t)cpu_to_le64(b);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(siphash24);

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()?  I have to ask, sorry :)


> +
> +#ifdef DEBUG
> +static const uint8_t test_vectors[64][8] = {
> +	{ 0x31, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0x47, 0xdb, 0x6f, 0x72 },
> +	{ 0xfd, 0x67, 0xdc, 0x93, 0xc5, 0x39, 0xf8, 0x74 },
> +	{ 0x5a, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0xd9, 0x09, 0x80, 0x6c, 0x0d },
> +	{ 0x2d, 0x7e, 0xfb, 0xd7, 0x96, 0x66, 0x67, 0x85 },
> +	{ 0xb7, 0x87, 0x71, 0x27, 0xe0, 0x94, 0x27, 0xcf },
> +	{ 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x99, 0xcd, 0x64, 0x55, 0x76, 0x18 },
> +	{ 0xce, 0xe3, 0xfe, 0x58, 0x6e, 0x46, 0xc9, 0xcb },
> +	{ 0x37, 0xd1, 0x01, 0x8b, 0xf5, 0x00, 0x02, 0xab },
> +	{ 0x62, 0x24, 0x93, 0x9a, 0x79, 0xf5, 0xf5, 0x93 },
> +	{ 0xb0, 0xe4, 0xa9, 0x0b, 0xdf, 0x82, 0x00, 0x9e },
> +	{ 0xf3, 0xb9, 0xdd, 0x94, 0xc5, 0xbb, 0x5d, 0x7a },
> +	{ 0xa7, 0xad, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x46, 0x2f, 0xb3, 0xf4 },
> +	{ 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0e, 0x86, 0xbc, 0x8f, 0x1e, 0x75 },
> +	{ 0x90, 0x3d, 0x84, 0xc0, 0x27, 0x56, 0xea, 0x14 },
> +	{ 0xee, 0xf2, 0x7a, 0x8e, 0x90, 0xca, 0x23, 0xf7 },
> +	{ 0xe5, 0x45, 0xbe, 0x49, 0x61, 0xca, 0x29, 0xa1 },
> +	{ 0xdb, 0x9b, 0xc2, 0x57, 0x7f, 0xcc, 0x2a, 0x3f },
> +	{ 0x94, 0x47, 0xbe, 0x2c, 0xf5, 0xe9, 0x9a, 0x69 },
> +	{ 0x9c, 0xd3, 0x8d, 0x96, 0xf0, 0xb3, 0xc1, 0x4b },
> +	{ 0xbd, 0x61, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x1d, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xbb },
> +	{ 0x98, 0xee, 0xa2, 0x1a, 0xf2, 0x5c, 0xd6, 0xbe },
> +	{ 0xc7, 0x67, 0x3b, 0x2e, 0xb0, 0xcb, 0xf2, 0xd0 },
> +	{ 0x88, 0x3e, 0xa3, 0xe3, 0x95, 0x67, 0x53, 0x93 },
> +	{ 0xc8, 0xce, 0x5c, 0xcd, 0x8c, 0x03, 0x0c, 0xa8 },
> +	{ 0x94, 0xaf, 0x49, 0xf6, 0xc6, 0x50, 0xad, 0xb8 },
> +	{ 0xea, 0xb8, 0x85, 0x8a, 0xde, 0x92, 0xe1, 0xbc },
> +	{ 0xf3, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x5b, 0xb8, 0x35, 0xd8, 0x17 },
> +	{ 0xad, 0xcf, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x63, 0x61, 0x2e, 0x2f },
> +	{ 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0xde },
> +	{ 0x71, 0x65, 0x95, 0x87, 0x66, 0x50, 0xa2, 0xa6 },
> +	{ 0x28, 0xef, 0x49, 0x5c, 0x53, 0xa3, 0x87, 0xad },
> +	{ 0x42, 0xc3, 0x41, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0x92, 0xd8, 0x32 },
> +	{ 0xce, 0x7c, 0xf2, 0x72, 0x2f, 0x51, 0x27, 0x71 },
> +	{ 0xe3, 0x78, 0x59, 0xf9, 0x46, 0x23, 0xf3, 0xa7 },
> +	{ 0x38, 0x12, 0x05, 0xbb, 0x1a, 0xb0, 0xe0, 0x12 },
> +	{ 0xae, 0x97, 0xa1, 0x0f, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xe0, 0x15 },
> +	{ 0xb4, 0xa3, 0x15, 0x08, 0xbe, 0xff, 0x4d, 0x31 },
> +	{ 0x81, 0x39, 0x62, 0x29, 0xf0, 0x90, 0x79, 0x02 },
> +	{ 0x4d, 0x0c, 0xf4, 0x9e, 0xe5, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0xca },
> +	{ 0x5c, 0x73, 0x33, 0x6a, 0x76, 0xd8, 0xbf, 0x9a },
> +	{ 0xd0, 0xa7, 0x04, 0x53, 0x6b, 0xa9, 0x3e, 0x0e },
> +	{ 0x92, 0x59, 0x58, 0xfc, 0xd6, 0x42, 0x0c, 0xad },
> +	{ 0xa9, 0x15, 0xc2, 0x9b, 0xc8, 0x06, 0x73, 0x18 },
> +	{ 0x95, 0x2b, 0x79, 0xf3, 0xbc, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0xd4 },
> +	{ 0xf2, 0x1d, 0xf2, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0x45, 0x35, 0xf9 },
> +	{ 0x87, 0x57, 0x75, 0x19, 0x04, 0x8f, 0x53, 0xa9 },
> +	{ 0x10, 0xa5, 0x6c, 0xf5, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x9a, 0xdb },
> +	{ 0xeb, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5c, 0xcd, 0x98, 0x6c, 0xd0 },
> +	{ 0x51, 0xa9, 0xcb, 0x9e, 0xcb, 0xa3, 0x12, 0xe6 },
> +	{ 0x96, 0xaf, 0xad, 0xfc, 0x2c, 0xe6, 0x66, 0xc7 },
> +	{ 0x72, 0xfe, 0x52, 0x97, 0x5a, 0x43, 0x64, 0xee },
> +	{ 0x5a, 0x16, 0x45, 0xb2, 0x76, 0xd5, 0x92, 0xa1 },
> +	{ 0xb2, 0x74, 0xcb, 0x8e, 0xbf, 0x87, 0x87, 0x0a },
> +	{ 0x6f, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x20, 0x3d, 0xe7, 0xb3, 0x81 },
> +	{ 0xea, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x22, 0xa8, 0x7f },
> +	{ 0x99, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x57, 0x24 },
> +	{ 0xbd, 0x83, 0x8d, 0x3a, 0xaf, 0xbf, 0x8d, 0xb7 },
> +	{ 0x0b, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0x32, 0x65, 0xd5, 0x1a, 0xea },
> +	{ 0x13, 0x50, 0x79, 0xa3, 0x23, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x60 },
> +	{ 0x93, 0x2b, 0x28, 0x46, 0xe4, 0xd7, 0x06, 0x66 },
> +	{ 0xe1, 0x91, 0x5f, 0x5c, 0xb1, 0xec, 0xa4, 0x6c },
> +	{ 0xf3, 0x25, 0x96, 0x5c, 0xa1, 0x6d, 0x62, 0x9f },
> +	{ 0x57, 0x5f, 0xf2, 0x8e, 0x60, 0x38, 0x1b, 0xe5 },
> +	{ 0x72, 0x45, 0x06, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0x32, 0x8a, 0x95 }
> +};
> +
> +static int siphash24_selftest(void)
> +{
> +	uint8_t in[64], k[16], i;
> +	uint64_t out;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
> +		k[i] = i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < 64; ++i) {
> +		in[i] = i;
> +		out = siphash24(in, i, k);
> +		if (memcmp(&out, test_vectors[i], 8)) {
> +			printk(KERN_INFO "siphash24: self-test %u: FAIL\n", i + 1);

pr_info()?

> +			ret = -1;

Pick a real error number?

> +		}
> +	}
> +	if (!ret)
> +		printk(KERN_INFO "siphash24: self-tests: pass\n");

pr_info()?

> +	return ret;
> +}
> +__initcall(siphash24_selftest);

Don't we have a "do crypto/library/whatever selftests at boot" config
option that this little test could be put under?  It would be great to
not have to manually add DEBUG to the build to verify this works on a
specific arch.

thanks,

greg k-h

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