linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 062/120] drivers: char: mem: Fix thinkos in kmem address checks

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Wed, 18 Jan 2017 11:46:20 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 062/120] drivers: char: mem: Fix thinkos in kmem address checks

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>

commit 488debb9971bc7d0edd6d8080ba78ca02a04f6c4 upstream.

When borrowing the pfn_valid() check from mmap_kmem(), somebody managed
to get physical and virtual addresses spectacularly muddled up, such
that we've ended up with checks for one being the other. Whilst this
does indeed prevent out-of-bounds accesses crashing, on most systems
it also prevents the more desirable use-case of working at all ever.

Check the *virtual* offset correctly for what it is. Furthermore, do
so in the right place - a read or write may span multiple pages, so a
single up-front check is insufficient. High memory accesses already
have a similar validity check just before the copy_to_user() call, so
just make the low memory path fully consistent with that.

Reported-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Fixes: 148a1bc84398 ("drivers: char: mem: Check {read,write}_kmem() addresses")
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/mem.c |   10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -381,9 +381,6 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *fi
 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vread() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;

-	if (!pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(p)))
-		return -EIO;
-
 	read = 0;
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		low_count = count;
@@ -412,6 +409,8 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *fi
 			 * by the kernel or data corruption may occur
 			 */
 			kbuf = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p);
+			if (!virt_addr_valid(kbuf))
+				return -ENXIO;

 			if (copy_to_user(buf, kbuf, sz))
 				return -EFAULT;
@@ -482,6 +481,8 @@ static ssize_t do_write_kmem(unsigned lo
 		 * corruption may occur.
 		 */
 		ptr = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p);
+		if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
+			return -ENXIO;

 		copied = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, sz);
 		if (copied) {
@@ -512,9 +513,6 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *f
 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;

-	if (!pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(p)))
-		return -EIO;
-
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);