linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 08/18] xen/pvcalls: implement connect command

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Date:   Thu, 18 May 2017 12:10:42 -0700 (PDT)
From:   Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>
To:     Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
cc:     Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        jgross@...e.com, Stefano Stabellini <stefano@...reto.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/18] xen/pvcalls: implement connect command

On Tue, 16 May 2017, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> >>> +	ret = xenbus_map_ring_valloc(dev, &req->u.connect.ref, 1, &page);
> >>> +	if (ret < 0) {
> >>> +		sock_release(map->sock);
> >>> +		kfree(map);
> >>> +		goto out;
> >>> +	}
> >>> +	map->ring = page;
> >>> +	map->ring_order = map->ring->ring_order;
> >>> +	/* first read the order, then map the data ring */
> >>> +	virt_rmb();
> >>
> >> Not sure I understand what the barrier is for here. I don't think compiler
> >> will reorder ring_order access with the call.
> > It's to avoid using the live version of ring_order to map the data ring
> > pages (the other end could be changing that value at any time). We want
> > to be sure that the compiler doesn't optimize out map->ring_order and
> > use map->ring->ring_order instead.
> 
> Wouldn't WRITE_ONCE(map->ring_order, map->ring->ring_order) be the right
> primitive then?

It doesn't have to be atomic, because right after the assignment we
check if map->ring_order is an appropriate value (see below).


> And also: if the other side changes ring size, what are we mapping then?
> It's obsolete by now.

If the grants are wrong, the mapping hypercalls will fail, the same way
they do with any of the other PV frontends/backends today. That is not
the problem we are trying to address with the barrier.

The issue is here is that by runtime changes to map->ring->ring_order,
the frontend could issue a denial of service by getting the backend into
a busyloop. You can imagine that:

  for (i = 0; i < map->ring->ring_order; i++) {

might not work as the backend expects if map->ring->ring_order can
change at any time.

One could say that the code is already written this way:

  for (i = 0; i < map->ring_order; i++) {

So what's the problem? We have seen instances in the past of the
compiler "optimizing" things in a way that actually the assembly did:

  for (i = 0; i < map->ring->ring_order; i++) {

This is why I put a barrier there, to avoid such compiler
"optimizations". Does it make sense?


> >>> +	if (map->ring_order > MAX_RING_ORDER) {
> >>> +		ret = -EFAULT;
> >>> +		goto out;
> >>> +	}
> >> If the barrier is indeed needed this check belongs before it.
> > I don't think so, see above.
> >
> >
> >>
> >>> +	ret = xenbus_map_ring_valloc(dev, map->ring->ref,
> >>> +				     (1 << map->ring_order), &page);
> >>> +	if (ret < 0) {
> >>> +		sock_release(map->sock);
> >>> +		xenbus_unmap_ring_vfree(dev, map->ring);
> >>> +		kfree(map);
> >>> +		goto out;
> >>> +	}
> >>> +	map->bytes = page;
> >>>
>