Date:   Thu, 8 Jun 2017 09:47:03 -0700
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Edward Cree <ecree@...arflare.com>
Cc:     davem@...emloft.net, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        iovisor-dev <iovisor-dev@...ts.iovisor.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned
 min/max values

On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 04:23:24PM +0100, Edward Cree wrote:
> On 08/06/17 03:40, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 03:59:25PM +0100, Edward Cree wrote:
> >> Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one
> >>  bound and an unsigned check of the other.
> >> We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting
> >>  ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as
> >>  unknown.  While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more
> >>  straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@...arflare.com>
> >> ---
> >>  include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  22 +-
> >>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 661 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
> >>  2 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 288 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> >> index e341469..10a5944 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> >> @@ -11,11 +11,15 @@
> >>  #include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
> >>  #include <linux/tnum.h>
> >>  
> >> - /* Just some arbitrary values so we can safely do math without overflowing and
> >> -  * are obviously wrong for any sort of memory access.
> >> -  */
> >> -#define BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE (1024 * 1024 * 1024)
> >> -#define BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE -1
> >> +/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses.
> >> + * In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
> >> + * ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
> >> + */
> >> +#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF	(1ULL << 31)
> >> +/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO].  This ensures
> >> + * that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
> >> + */
> >> +#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ	INT_MAX
> >>  
> >>  struct bpf_reg_state {
> >>  	enum bpf_reg_type type;
> >> @@ -38,7 +42,7 @@ struct bpf_reg_state {
> >>  	 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, we have to NULL-check it _first_.
> >>  	 */
> >>  	u32 id;
> >> -	/* These three fields must be last.  See states_equal() */
> >> +	/* These five fields must be last.  See states_equal() */
> >>  	/* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of
> >>  	 * the actual value.
> >>  	 * For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset
> >> @@ -51,8 +55,10 @@ struct bpf_reg_state {
> >>  	 * These refer to the same value as align, not necessarily the actual
> >>  	 * contents of the register.
> >>  	 */
> >> -	s64 min_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
> >> -	u64 max_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
> >> +	s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
> >> +	s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */
> >> +	u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */
> >> +	u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
> > have uneasy feeling about this one.
> > It's 16 extra bytes to be stored in every reg_state and memcmp later
> > while we didn't have cases where people wanted negative values
> > in ptr+var cases. Why bother than?
> It was the only way I could see to both pass my new test (correctly reject
>  an uninformative combination of JGT and JSGT), and still pass one of the
>  other tests where we have to accept an informative combination of JGT and
>  JSGT.  This isn't so much about supporting negative numbers as it is about
>  deducing the right bounds from signed checks, or a mixture of signed and
>  unsigned checks on the same value.
> For instance, if you check a register is s< 5, you know nothing yet about
>  its unsigned maximum (it could be -1).  But if you then check it's u< 10,
>  or even if you check it's s>= 0, you've now learned its sign bit so you
>  can conclude from the previous check that it's u< 5.  But to conclude
>  that, you have to have stored the bound from the previous check.
> I'm not too worried about the extra 16 bytes, because this is a control-
>  plane operation, and I'd be surprised if its performance really turned out
>  to be a problem.  But if there's a better way to handle these checks, I'm
>  all ears.
> >>  unknown.  While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more
> >>  straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds.
> > it's hard for me to see the 'straightforward' part yet.
> Well, the new reg_set_min_max[_inv]() are simpler, as they just update the
>  relevant bound then call __reg_deduce_bounds() to propagate that knowledge
>  into the others, rather than having confusing (and, as we've seen, buggy)
>  logic in each case about "if we did this kind of check we've learned that
>  thing in this branch".
> Also, all the care to check "did we exceed BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE?" goes
>  away, as does special handling of negatives to turn them into
>  BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE (again, this has bugs in the current code).  Instead
>  we just have to check "does our operation on the bounds overflow?", and if
>  so, mark our bounds as unknown.
> I think a lot of the arithmetic ops become a more mechanical "does this
>  overflow?  No?  Then let's compute new bounds".  But then, that's partly
>  because the semantics of the old min_value and max_value weren't documented
>  anywhere (do they refer to the signed or the unsigned value in the
>  register?) and so it's unclear to me why some of the code does what it does.

got it. that all makes sense.

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