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Date:   Thu, 14 Sep 2017 18:35:15 -0400
From:   Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@...cle.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        x86@...nel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, borntraeger@...ibm.com,
        heiko.carstens@...ibm.com, davem@...emloft.net,
        willy@...radead.org, mhocko@...nel.org, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
        will.deacon@....com, catalin.marinas@....com, sam@...nborg.org,
        mgorman@...hsingularity.net, Steven.Sistare@...cle.com,
        daniel.m.jordan@...cle.com, bob.picco@...cle.com
Subject: [PATCH v8 09/11] x86/kasan: explicitly zero kasan shadow memory

To optimize the performance of struct page initialization,
vmemmap_populate() will no longer zero memory.

We must explicitly zero the memory that is allocated by vmemmap_populate()
for kasan, as this memory does not go through struct page initialization
path.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@...cle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@...cle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@...cle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@...cle.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index bc84b73684b7..cc0399032673 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -84,6 +84,66 @@ static struct notifier_block kasan_die_notifier = {
 };
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * x86 variant of vmemmap_populate() uses either PMD_SIZE pages or base pages
+ * to map allocated memory.  This routine determines the page size for the given
+ * address from vmemmap.
+ */
+static u64 get_vmemmap_pgsz(u64 addr)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+
+	pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+	BUG_ON(pgd_none(*pgd) || pgd_large(*pgd));
+
+	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+	BUG_ON(p4d_none(*p4d) || p4d_large(*p4d));
+
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+	BUG_ON(pud_none(*pud) || pud_large(*pud));
+
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+	BUG_ON(pmd_none(*pmd));
+
+	if (pmd_large(*pmd))
+		return PMD_SIZE;
+	return PAGE_SIZE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Memory that was allocated by vmemmap_populate is not zeroed, so we must
+ * zero it here explicitly.
+ */
+static void
+zero_vmemmap_populated_memory(void)
+{
+	u64 i, start, end;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < E820_MAX_ENTRIES && pfn_mapped[i].end; i++) {
+		void *kaddr_start = pfn_to_kaddr(pfn_mapped[i].start);
+		void *kaddr_end = pfn_to_kaddr(pfn_mapped[i].end);
+
+		start = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow(kaddr_start);
+		end = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow(kaddr_end);
+
+		/* Round to the start end of the mapped pages */
+		start = rounddown(start, get_vmemmap_pgsz(start));
+		end = roundup(end, get_vmemmap_pgsz(start));
+		memset((void *)start, 0, end - start);
+	}
+
+	start = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_stext);
+	end = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_end);
+
+	/* Round to the start end of the mapped pages */
+	start = rounddown(start, get_vmemmap_pgsz(start));
+	end = roundup(end, get_vmemmap_pgsz(start));
+	memset((void *)start, 0, end - start);
+}
+
 void __init kasan_early_init(void)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -146,6 +206,12 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 	load_cr3(init_top_pgt);
 	__flush_tlb_all();
 
+	/*
+	 * vmemmap_populate does not zero the memory, so we need to zero it
+	 * explicitly
+	 */
+	zero_vmemmap_populated_memory();
+
 	/*
 	 * kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
 	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
-- 
2.14.1

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