| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 16:30:01 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
Cc: Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Joel Stanley <joel@....id.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map
On Thu, Nov 16, 2017 at 2:19 AM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org> wrote:
> From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
>
> Both load_elf_interp and load_elf_binary rely on elf_map to map segments
> on a controlled address and they use MAP_FIXED to enforce that. This is
> however dangerous thing prone to silent data corruption which can be
> even exploitable. Let's take CVE-2017-1000253 as an example. At the time
> (before eab09532d400 ("binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE"))
> ELF_ET_DYN_BASE was at TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2 which is not that far away from
> the stack top on 32b (legacy) memory layout (only 1GB away). Therefore
> we could end up mapping over the existing stack with some luck.
>
> The issue has been fixed since then (a87938b2e246 ("fs/binfmt_elf.c:
> fix bug in loading of PIE binaries")), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE moved moved much
> further from the stack (eab09532d400 and later by c715b72c1ba4 ("mm:
> revert x86_64 and arm64 ELF_ET_DYN_BASE base changes")) and excessive
> stack consumption early during execve fully stopped by da029c11e6b1
> ("exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM"). So we should be
> safe and any attack should be impractical. On the other hand this is
> just too subtle assumption so it can break quite easily and hard to
> spot.
>
> I believe that the MAP_FIXED usage in load_elf_binary (et. al) is still
> fundamentally dangerous. Moreover it shouldn't be even needed. We are
> at the early process stage and so there shouldn't be unrelated mappings
> (except for stack and loader) existing so mmap for a given address
> should succeed even without MAP_FIXED. Something is terribly wrong if
> this is not the case and we should rather fail than silently corrupt the
> underlying mapping.
>
> Address this issue by changing MAP_FIXED to the newly added
> MAP_FIXED_SAFE. This will mean that mmap will fail if there is an
> existing mapping clashing with the requested one without clobbering it.
>
> Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@....id.au>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
Once (if?) the name gets settled, this looks good to me:
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> arch/metag/kernel/process.c | 6 +++++-
> fs/binfmt_elf.c | 12 ++++++++----
> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/metag/kernel/process.c b/arch/metag/kernel/process.c
> index c4606ce743d2..2286140e54e0 100644
> --- a/arch/metag/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/metag/kernel/process.c
> @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ unsigned long __metag_elf_map(struct file *filep, unsigned long addr,
> tcm_tag = tcm_lookup_tag(addr);
>
> if (tcm_tag != TCM_INVALID_TAG)
> - type &= ~MAP_FIXED;
> + type &= ~(MAP_FIXED | MAP_FIXED_SAFE);
>
> /*
> * total_size is the size of the ELF (interpreter) image.
> @@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ unsigned long __metag_elf_map(struct file *filep, unsigned long addr,
> } else
> map_addr = vm_mmap(filep, addr, size, prot, type, off);
>
> + if ((type & MAP_FIXED_SAFE) && BAD_ADDR(map_addr))
> + pr_info("%d (%s): Uhuuh, elf segement at %p requested but the memory is mapped already\n",
> + task_pid_nr(current), tsk->comm, (void*)addr);
> +
> if (!BAD_ADDR(map_addr) && tcm_tag != TCM_INVALID_TAG) {
> struct tcm_allocation *tcm;
> unsigned long tcm_addr;
> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> index 6466153f2bf0..12b21942ccde 100644
> --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> @@ -372,6 +372,10 @@ static unsigned long elf_map(struct file *filep, unsigned long addr,
> } else
> map_addr = vm_mmap(filep, addr, size, prot, type, off);
>
> + if ((type & MAP_FIXED_SAFE) && BAD_ADDR(map_addr))
> + pr_info("%d (%s): Uhuuh, elf segement at %p requested but the memory is mapped already\n",
> + task_pid_nr(current), current->comm, (void*)addr);
> +
> return(map_addr);
> }
>
> @@ -569,7 +573,7 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(struct elfhdr *interp_elf_ex,
> elf_prot |= PROT_EXEC;
> vaddr = eppnt->p_vaddr;
> if (interp_elf_ex->e_type == ET_EXEC || load_addr_set)
> - elf_type |= MAP_FIXED;
> + elf_type |= MAP_FIXED_SAFE;
> else if (no_base && interp_elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN)
> load_addr = -vaddr;
>
> @@ -929,7 +933,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> * the ET_DYN load_addr calculations, proceed normally.
> */
> if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC || load_addr_set) {
> - elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
> + elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED_SAFE;
> } else if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_DYN) {
> /*
> * This logic is run once for the first LOAD Program
> @@ -965,7 +969,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> load_bias = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE;
> if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
> load_bias += arch_mmap_rnd();
> - elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
> + elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED_SAFE;
> } else
> load_bias = 0;
>
> @@ -1220,7 +1224,7 @@ static int load_elf_library(struct file *file)
> (eppnt->p_filesz +
> ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)),
> PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
> - MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE,
> + MAP_FIXED_SAFE | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE,
> (eppnt->p_offset -
> ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)));
> if (error != ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr))
> --
> 2.15.0
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists