linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 63/72] crypto: dh - Dont permit key or g size longer than p

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Date:   Sun, 19 Nov 2017 15:39:07 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@...rochip.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 63/72] crypto: dh - Dont permit key or g size longer than p

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>

commit ccd9888f14a8019c0bbdeeae758aba1f58693712 upstream.

The "qat-dh" DH implementation assumes that 'key' and 'g' can be copied
into a buffer with size 'p_size'.  However it was never checked that
that was actually the case, which most likely allowed users to cause a
buffer underflow via KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE.

Fix this by updating crypto_dh_decode_key() to verify this precondition
for all DH implementations.

Fixes: c9839143ebbf ("crypto: qat - Add DH support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@...rochip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 crypto/dh_helper.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/crypto/dh_helper.c
+++ b/crypto/dh_helper.c
@@ -83,6 +83,14 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf
 	if (secret.len != crypto_dh_key_len(params))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * Don't permit the buffer for 'key' or 'g' to be larger than 'p', since
+	 * some drivers assume otherwise.
+	 */
+	if (params->key_size > params->p_size ||
+	    params->g_size > params->p_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Don't allocate memory. Set pointers to data within
 	 * the given buffer
 	 */