linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 11/11] intel

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Date:   Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:37:41 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc:     intel-sgx-kernel-dev@...ts.01.org,
        platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 11/11] intel_sgx: driver documentation

On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 10:53:27PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 10:49:48PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Pre-boot firmware could potentially configure the root key hash for the
> > enclave that signs launch tokens for other enclaves i.e. the launch
> > enclave that is built and signed during the kbuild.
> 
> So how about firmware doesn't do anything and the machine owner decide
> what enclaves get launched and what key hashes to load for a change?
> I.e., let the owner really own the hardware she paid money for.
> 
> Or are we doing encrypted enclaves but then the firmware vendor can look
> inside too?
> 
> -- 
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.

Firmware cannot access the memory inside an enclave. CPU asserts every
memory access coming outside the enclave.

/Jarkko