linux-kernel - [PATCH] fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel

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Date:   Sat,  2 Dec 2017 14:27:39 +0100
From:   Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH] fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy()

git commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext
data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy
checks. Copying to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple
memcpy() assuming that it is always valid to read from kernel memory
iff the kern_addr_valid() check passed.

A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore
of=/dev/null" now can easily crash the kernel, since the former
execption handling on invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work
anymore.

Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help
here. Most architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple
implemented a page table walk to figure out if something is mapped at
the address in question.
With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all
the time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before
executing the memcpy() also doesn't work.

Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce
buffer. This also allows to simplify read_kcore().

At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce
warnings that were removed with df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add
bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic
probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions.

While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could
be completely removed...(?)

Fixes: df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data")
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
---
 fs/proc/kcore.c | 18 +++++-------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c
index 4bc85cb8be6a..e8a93bc8285d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
@@ -512,23 +512,15 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
 				return -EFAULT;
 		} else {
 			if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
-				unsigned long n;
-
 				/*
 				 * Using bounce buffer to bypass the
 				 * hardened user copy kernel text checks.
 				 */
-				memcpy(buf, (char *) start, tsz);
-				n = copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz);
-				/*
-				 * We cannot distinguish between fault on source
-				 * and fault on destination. When this happens
-				 * we clear too and hope it will trigger the
-				 * EFAULT again.
-				 */
-				if (n) { 
-					if (clear_user(buffer + tsz - n,
-								n))
+				if (probe_kernel_read(buf, (void *) start, tsz)) {
+					if (clear_user(buffer, tsz))
+						return -EFAULT;
+				} else {
+					if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz))
 						return -EFAULT;
 				}
 			} else {
-- 
2.13.5