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Date:   Fri,  2 Feb 2018 17:57:39 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 10/67] bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>

[ upstream commit f37a8cb84cce18762e8f86a70bd6a49a66ab964c ]

Alexei found that verifier does not reject stores into context
via BPF_ST instead of BPF_STX. And while looking at it, we
also should not allow XADD variant of BPF_STX.

The context rewriter is only assuming either BPF_LDX_MEM- or
BPF_STX_MEM-type operations, thus reject anything other than
that so that assumptions in the rewriter properly hold. Add
test cases as well for BPF selftests.

Fixes: d691f9e8d440 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -683,6 +683,13 @@ static bool is_pointer_value(struct veri
 	}
 }
 
+static bool is_ctx_reg(struct verifier_env *env, int regno)
+{
+	const struct reg_state *reg = &env->cur_state.regs[regno];
+
+	return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX;
+}
+
 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
  * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
  * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
@@ -779,6 +786,12 @@ static int check_xadd(struct verifier_en
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
+	if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
+		verbose("BPF_XADD stores into R%d context is not allowed\n",
+			insn->dst_reg);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
 	/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
@@ -1909,6 +1922,12 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 
+			if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
+				verbose("BPF_ST stores into R%d context is not allowed\n",
+					insn->dst_reg);
+				return -EACCES;
+			}
+
 			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
 			err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
 					       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,


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