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Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 09:02:25 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, tglx@...utronix.de,
x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com,
dave.hansen@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Support "Enhanced IBRS" on future
CPUs
On 12/02/2018 16:27, David Woodhouse wrote:
> The original IBRS hack in microcode is horribly slow. For the next
> generation of CPUs, as a stopgap until we get a proper fix, Intel
> promise an "Enhanced IBRS" which will be fast.
>
> The assumption is that predictions in the BTB/RSB will be tagged with
> the VMX mode and ring that they were learned in, and thus the CPU will
> avoid consuming unsafe predictions without a performance penalty.
>
> Intel's documentation says that it is still required to set the IBRS bit
> in the SPEC_CTRL MSR and ensure that it remains set.
>
> Cope with this by trapping and emulating *all* access to SPEC_CTRL from
> KVM guests when the IBRS_ALL feature is present, so it can never be
> turned off. Guests who see IBRS_ALL should never do anything except
> turn it on at boot anyway. And if they didn't know about IBRS_ALL and
> they keep frobbing IBRS on every kernel entry/exit... well the vmexit
> for a no-op is probably going to be faster than they were expecting
> anyway, so they'll live.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 9 ++++++++-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
> 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index 788c4da..524bb86 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -140,9 +140,16 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
> SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
> SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
> SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
> - SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
> + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ALL,
> };
>
> +extern enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled;
> +
> +static inline bool spectre_v2_ibrs_all(void)
> +{
> + return spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ALL;
> +}
> +
> extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
> extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index debcdda..047538a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -88,12 +88,13 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
> [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
> [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
> [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
> + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ALL] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
> };
>
> #undef pr_fmt
> #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
>
> -static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
> +enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
>
> #ifdef RETPOLINE
> static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
> @@ -237,6 +238,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>
> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
> + u64 ia32_cap = 0;
> +
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
> + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) {
> + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ALL;
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS);
> + goto ibrs_all;
> + }
> + }
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
> goto retpoline_auto;
> break;
> @@ -274,6 +285,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
> }
>
> + ibrs_all:
> spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
> pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
>
> @@ -306,7 +318,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> * branches. But we don't know whether the firmware is safe, so
> * use IBRS to protect against that:
> */
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
> + if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ALL && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
> pr_info("Spectre mitigation: Restricting branch speculation (enabling IBRS) for firmware calls\n");
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index 91e3539..d99ba9b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -3419,13 +3419,14 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>
> vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
>
> - if (!data)
> + if (!data && !spectre_v2_ibrs_all())
> break;
This should check the value of IBRS_ALL in the VM, not in the host.
> /*
> * For non-nested:
> * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
> - * it through.
> + * it through unless we have IBRS_ALL and it should just be
> + * set for ever.
> *
> * For nested:
> * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
> @@ -9441,7 +9442,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
> * being speculatively taken.
> */
> - if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
> + if (vmx->spec_ctrl && !spectre_v2_ibrs_all())
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
Same here, and it should also be
if (vmx->spec_ctrl != host_spec_ctrl())
where
static inline int host_spec_ctrl()
{
return spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
}
Likewise below.
Paolo
> vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
> @@ -9577,11 +9578,13 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
> * save it.
> */
> - if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
> - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
> + if (!spectre_v2_ibrs_all) {
> + if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
>
> - if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
> - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> + if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> + }
>
> /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
> vmexit_fill_RSB();
>
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