linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.4 187/193] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS

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Date:   Fri, 23 Feb 2018 19:27:00 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@...fitbricks.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 187/193] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>

(cherry picked from commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881)

Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
[jwang: cherry pick to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@...fitbricks.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {