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Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2018 00:16:46 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: luto@...nel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, jmorris@...ei.org,
Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
jforbes@...hat.com, linux-man@...r.kernel.org, jlee@...e.com,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:15 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Exactly like EVERY OTHER KERNEL CONFIG OPTION.
> >
> > So your argument is that we should make the user experience worse?
Without
> > some sort of verified boot mechanism, lockdown is just security theater.
> > There's no good reason to enable it unless you have some mechanism for
> > verifying that you booted something you trust.
> Wow. Way to snip the rest of the email where I told you what the
> solution was. Let me repeat it here, since you so conveniently missed
> it and deleted it:
I ignored it because it's not a viable option. Part of the patchset
disables various kernel command line options. If there's a kernel command
line option that disables the patchset then it's pointless.
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