[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 17:18:09 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Justin Forbes <jforbes@...hat.com>,
linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>, joeyli <jlee@...e.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:16 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:15 PM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
> wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Exactly like EVERY OTHER KERNEL CONFIG OPTION.
>> >
>> > So your argument is that we should make the user experience worse?
> Without
>> > some sort of verified boot mechanism, lockdown is just security theater.
>> > There's no good reason to enable it unless you have some mechanism for
>> > verifying that you booted something you trust.
>
>> Wow. Way to snip the rest of the email where I told you what the
>> solution was. Let me repeat it here, since you so conveniently missed
>> it and deleted it:
>
> I ignored it because it's not a viable option. Part of the patchset
> disables various kernel command line options. If there's a kernel command
> line option that disables the patchset then it's pointless.
if your secure boot-enabled bootloader can't prevent a bad guy from
using malicious kernel command line parameters, then fix it.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists