linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] af_key: Always verify length of provided sadb

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Date:   Mon, 9 Apr 2018 12:33:39 +0200
From:   Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
To:     Kevin Easton <kevin@...rana.org>
CC:     Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] af_key: Always verify length of provided sadb_key

On Sat, Apr 07, 2018 at 11:40:33AM -0400, Kevin Easton wrote:
> Key extensions (struct sadb_key) include a user-specified number of key
> bits.  The kernel uses that number to determine how much key data to copy
> out of the message in pfkey_msg2xfrm_state().
> 
> The length of the sadb_key message must be verified to be long enough,
> even in the case of SADB_X_AALG_NULL.  Furthermore, the sadb_key_len value
> must be long enough to include both the key data and the struct sadb_key
> itself.
> 
> Introduce a helper function verify_key_len(), and call it from
> parse_exthdrs() where other exthdr types are similarly checked for
> correctness.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kevin Easton <kevin@...rana.org>
> Reported-by: syzbot+5022a34ca5a3d49b84223653fab632dfb7b4cf37@...kaller.appspotmail.com

Applied to the ipsec tree, thanks Kevin!