linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 06/10] x86/cet: Add arch

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Fri, 8 Jun 2018 05:24:22 -0700
From:   "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        mike.kravetz@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/10] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack

On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 9:38 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 9:10 PM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 4:01 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>> > On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 3:02 PM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@...il.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 2:01 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>> >> > On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 1:33 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On Thu, 2018-06-07 at 11:48 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> >> > On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:41 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>> >> >> > >
>> >> >> > > The following operations are provided.
>> >> >> > >
>> >> >> > > ARCH_CET_STATUS:
>> >> >> > >         return the current CET status
>> >> >> > >
>> >> >> > > ARCH_CET_DISABLE:
>> >> >> > >         disable CET features
>> >> >> > >
>> >> >> > > ARCH_CET_LOCK:
>> >> >> > >         lock out CET features
>> >> >> > >
>> >> >> > > ARCH_CET_EXEC:
>> >> >> > >         set CET features for exec()
>> >> >> > >
>> >> >> > > ARCH_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK:
>> >> >> > >         allocate a new shadow stack
>> >> >> > >
>> >> >> > > ARCH_CET_PUSH_SHSTK:
>> >> >> > >         put a return address on shadow stack
>> >> >> > >
>> >> >> > > ARCH_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK and ARCH_CET_PUSH_SHSTK are intended only for
>> >> >> > > the implementation of GLIBC ucontext related APIs.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Please document exactly what these all do and why.  I don't understand
>> >> >> > what purpose ARCH_CET_LOCK and ARCH_CET_EXEC serve.  CET is opt in for
>> >> >> > each ELF program, so I think there should be no need for a magic
>> >> >> > override.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> CET is initially enabled if the loader has CET capability.  Then the
>> >> >> loader decides if the application can run with CET.  If the application
>> >> >> cannot run with CET (e.g. a dependent library does not have CET), then
>> >> >> the loader turns off CET before passing to the application.  When the
>> >> >> loader is done, it locks out CET and the feature cannot be turned off
>> >> >> anymore until the next exec() call.
>> >> >
>> >> > Why is the lockout necessary?  If user code enables CET and tries to
>> >> > run code that doesn't support CET, it will crash.  I don't see why we
>> >> > need special code in the kernel to prevent a user program from calling
>> >> > arch_prctl() and crashing itself.  There are already plenty of ways to
>> >> > do that :)
>> >>
>> >> On CET enabled machine, not all programs nor shared libraries are
>> >> CET enabled.  But since ld.so is CET enabled, all programs start
>> >> as CET enabled.  ld.so will disable CET if a program or any of its shared
>> >> libraries aren't CET enabled.  ld.so will lock up CET once it is done CET
>> >> checking so that CET can't no longer be disabled afterwards.
>> >
>> > Yeah, I got that.  No one has explained *why*.
>>
>> It is to prevent malicious code from disabling CET.
>>
>
> By the time malicious code issue its own syscalls, you've already lost
> the battle.  I could probably be convinced that a lock-CET-on feature
> that applies *only* to the calling thread and is not inherited by
> clone() is a decent idea, but I'd want to see someone who understands
> the state of the art in exploit design justify it.  You're also going
> to need to figure out how to make CRIU work if you allow locking CET
> on.
>
> A priori, I think we should just not provide a lock mechanism.

We need a door for CET.  But it is a very bad idea to leave it open
all the time.  I don't know much about CRIU,  If it is Checkpoint/Restore
In Userspace.  Can you free any application with AVX512 on AVX512
machine and restore it on non-AVX512 machine?

>> > (Also, shouldn't the vDSO itself be marked as supporting CET?)
>>
>> No. vDSO is loaded by kernel.  vDSO in CET kernel is CET
>> compatible.
>>
>
> I think the vDSO should do its best to act like a real DSO.  That
> means that, if the vDSO supports CET, it should advertise support for
> CET using the Linux ABI.  Since you're going to require GCC 8 anyway,
> this should be a single line of code in the Makefile.

Sure.  A couple lines.

-- 
H.J.