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Date:   Mon, 25 Jun 2018 10:49:28 +0200
From:   Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>
To:     Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
        Guenter Roeck <linux@...ck-us.net>,
        Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
        Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
        linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        qemu-s390x <qemu-s390x@...gnu.org>,
        qemu-devel <qemu-devel@...gnu.org>,
        Thomas Huth <thuth@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: s390 qemu boot failure in -next

On Mon, 25 Jun 2018 10:36:33 +0200
Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:

> This change has been done on purpose. Uncompressed image is not going
> to be bootable any more. In future the decompressor phase would get
> more function (early memory detection as an example) and there is no
> chance to duplicate that code in uncompressed image as well (to keep it
> bootable on its own). The patch series commit messages contain more
> technical details.
> 
> For qemu either bzImage or arch/s390/boot/compressed/vmlinux should be
> used, which are bootable images.
> 
> But that's really confusing that uncompressed vmlinux is still kind
> of booting. May be we should discuss how to avoid this confusion
> (may be change uncompressed image enty point to a function doing
> disabled wait with badb007 or smth) and how to encourage people to use
> arch/s390/boot/compressed/vmlinux instead.

So, the intention is that you can't boot the uncompressed image
anywhere? (Was it possible before, e.g. when punching the image under
z/VM?) If yes, it would make sense to explicitly fence it. But I'm
worried that it would break previously working setups (did we document
the purpose of the images anywhere?)

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