lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Sun, 15 Jul 2018 11:05:44 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@...il.com>
Cc:     Rob Springer <rspringer@...gle.com>,
        John Joseph <jnjoseph@...gle.com>,
        Ben Chan <benchan@...omium.org>, devel@...verdev.osuosl.org,
        Zhongze Hu <frankhu@...omium.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Simon Que <sque@...omium.org>,
        Guenter Roeck <groeck@...omium.org>,
        Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/18] staging: gasket: always allow root open for write

On Fri, Jul 13, 2018 at 10:58:09PM -0700, Todd Poynor wrote:
> From: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@...gle.com>
> 
> Always allow root to open device for writing.
> 
> Drop special-casing of ioctl permissions for root vs. owner.
> 
> Reported-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Zhongze Hu <frankhu@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@...gle.com>
> ---
>  drivers/staging/gasket/apex_driver.c  |  9 +++------
>  drivers/staging/gasket/gasket_core.c  |  8 +++++---
>  drivers/staging/gasket/gasket_ioctl.c | 15 ++++++---------
>  3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/staging/gasket/apex_driver.c b/drivers/staging/gasket/apex_driver.c
> index b1318482ba65..ffe11d8168ea 100644
> --- a/drivers/staging/gasket/apex_driver.c
> +++ b/drivers/staging/gasket/apex_driver.c
> @@ -644,13 +644,10 @@ static bool is_gcb_in_reset(struct gasket_dev *gasket_dev)
>  static uint apex_ioctl_check_permissions(struct file *filp, uint cmd)
>  {
>  	struct gasket_dev *gasket_dev = filp->private_data;
> -	int root = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> -	int is_owner = gasket_dev->dev_info.ownership.is_owned &&
> -		       current->tgid == gasket_dev->dev_info.ownership.owner;
> +	fmode_t write;
>  
> -	if (root || is_owner)
> -		return 1;
> -	return 0;
> +	write = filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE;

Ok, this is insane.  You don't change, or check, the permissions on a
file handle while it is already open, as you only check the permissions
on OPEN, not on WRITE.  See the recent rant from Linus on the linux-api
list for yet-another-long-threaad in which he explains this.

So this whole ioctl can just be removed, it is totally crazy and wrong
and should just be removed.

Want me to go remove it right now?

thanks,

greg k-h

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ