Date:   Tue, 9 Oct 2018 13:22:16 +0200
From:   Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
To:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Linux MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Randomize free memory

On Thu 04-10-18 09:44:35, Dan Williams wrote:
> Hi Michal,
> 
> On Thu, Oct 4, 2018 at 12:53 AM Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed 03-10-18 19:15:18, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > Changes since v1:
> > > * Add support for shuffling hot-added memory (Andrew)
> > > * Update cover letter and commit message to clarify the performance impact
> > >   and relevance to future platforms
> >
> > I believe this hasn't addressed my questions in
> > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002143015.GX18290@dhcp22.suse.cz. Namely
> > "
> > It is the more general idea that I am not really sure about. First of
> > all. Does it make _any_ sense to randomize 4MB blocks by default? Why
> > cannot we simply have it disabled?
> 
> I'm not aware of any CVE that this would directly preclude, but that
> said the entropy injected at 4MB boundaries raises the bar on heap
> attacks. Environments that want more can adjust that with the boot
> parameter. Given the potential benefits I think it would only make
> sense to default disable it if there was a significant runtime impact,
> from what I have seen there isn't.
> 
> > Then and more concerning question is,
> > does it even make sense to have this randomization applied to higher
> > orders than 0? Attacker might fragment the memory and keep recycling the
> > lowest order and get the predictable behavior that we have right now.
> 
> Certainly I expect there are attacks that can operate within a 4MB
> window, as I expect there are attacks that could operate within a 4K
> window that would need sub-page randomization to deter. In fact I
> believe that is the motivation for CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM.
> Combining that with page allocator randomization makes the kernel less
> predictable.

I am sorry but this hasn't explained anything (at least to me). I can
still see a way to bypass this randomization by fragmenting the memory.
With that possibility in place this doesn't really provide the promissed
additional security. So either I am missing something or the per-order
threshold is simply a wrong interface to a broken security misfeature.

> Is that enough justification for this patch on its own?

I do not think so from what I have heard so far.

> It's
> debatable. Combine that though with the wider availability of
> platforms with memory-side-cache and I think it's a reasonable default
> behavior for the kernel to deploy.

OK, this sounds a bit more interesting. I am going to speculate because
memory-side-cache is way too generic of a term for me to imagine
anything specific. Many years back while at a university I was playing
with page coloring as a method to reach a more stable performance
results due to reduced cache conflicts. It was not always a performance
gain but it definitely allowed for more stable run-to-run comparable
results. I can imagine that a randomization might lead to a similar effect
although I am not sure how much and it would be more interesting to hear
about that effect. If this is really the case then I would assume on/off
knob to control the randomization without something as specific as
order.
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

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