Date:	Mon, 25 Feb 2013 10:02:42 -0800
From:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:	Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
CC:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, Andy King <acking@...are.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@...hat.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: AF_VSOCK and the LSMs

On 2/25/2013 8:55 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> [NOTE/WARNING: we're veering away from the VSOCK discussion and towards a LSM 
> stacking discussion; see my response to Gerd if you want to stay on topic.]
>
> On Saturday, February 23, 2013 03:43:23 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 2/22/2013 4:45 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Friday, February 22, 2013 03:00:04 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> Please add an LSM blob. Please do not use a secid. I am currently
>>>> battling with secids in my efforts for multiple LSM support.
>>>>
>>>> ...
>>>>
>>>> I am going to be able to deal with secids for AF_INET only because
>>>> SELinux prefers XFRM, Smack requires CIPSO, and AppArmor is going to
>>>> be willing to have networking be optional.
>>> "prefers"?  Really Casey, did you think I would let you get away with that
>>> statement?  What a LSM "prefers" is really not relevant to the stacking
>>> effort, what a LSM _supports_ is what matters.
>> I suppose. My point, which you may refute if it is incorrect,
>> is that there are common, legitimate SELinux configurations which
>> eschew Netlabel in favor of XFRM.
> There are common, legitimate use cases which use exclusively NetLabel, 
> exclusively labeled IPsec, and both.  A LSM stacking design that forces 
> SELinux to only operate with XFRM (labeled IPsec) is wrong.  If you are giving 
> admins the ability to selectively stack LSMs you should also allow them to 
> selectively pick which non-shareable functionality they assign to each LSM.

That is the approach I'm taking. The kernel configuration
will specify which LSM gets Netlabel and which gets XFRM.

A Smack configuration that does not use Netlabel is possible,
but to my mind extremely uninteresting. If someone has a
use case that is best addressed using both Smack and SELinux*
it seems that the most likely configuration would be for
Smack to use Netlabel and SELinux XFRM.

------
* What that case might be is not something I'm especially keen
  on considering in depth just now.
 

>>> SELinux _supports_ NetLabel (CIPSO, etc.), XFRM (labeled IPsec), and
>>> secmark.
>>>
>>> Smack _supports_ NetLabel (CIPSO).
>>>
>>> AppArmor and TOMOYO don't really do any of the forms of labeled networking
>>> that are relevant for this discussion.
>> I am informed that labeled networking is being developed as an
>> option for AppArmor.
> I've remember hearing the same several years ago too, until we see patches it 
> doesn't make sense to spend a lot of time worrying about what the AppArmor 
> developers plan to support.  Regardless, if anything I think this only 
> furthers the need to provide a mechanism to selectively assign non-shareable 
> LSM functionality to individuals LSMs in a stacked scenario.

I have not seen patches, but as Smack+AppArmor and SELinux+AppArmor are
included in my success criteria for module stacking I have to keep the
plan in mind. BTW, Smack+SELinux is not a success criteria, but it would
sure feel good to be able to claim total victory.


>>> If you want to try option #3 I think we might be able to do something with
>>> NetLabel to support multiple LSMs as the label abstraction stuff should
>>> theoretically make this possible; although the NetLabel cache will need
>>> some work.
>> It is reasonably easy to restrict Netlabel to a single LSM,
>> and since SELinux seems better served by XFRM in most configurations ...
> I disagree.  In some use cases SELinux is better served by XFRM, in others it 
> is better served by NetLabel.  Once again, I think you need to focus on what 
> is possible with the LSMs rather than a particular set of use cases which 
> happen to make the LSM stacking project easier.

I'm trying not to make too many architectural changes to the
code around the LSM mechanism itself. I don't see that as cost
effective or likely to be popular. If the implication of that is
that there are certain configurations that are unsupportable but
that have plausible alternatives I think it will do for phase I.

If you want SELinux using Netlabel and Smack using Netlabel at
the same time you're going to have to change something. That
might well involve reimplementing Smack in SELinux policy*,
switching SELinux to XFRM if that's reasonable or using other
mechanisms like containers. It's not like we have a shortage
of mechanisms available.

-----
* I'm still waiting to see this. It was only supposed to take
  a couple days. :-)

>> and AppArmor intends to make networking an option that seems
>> like a viable strategy until Netlabel gets multiple LSM support.
> It would be nice if the AppArmor developers could share their plans - or have 
> I missed them on the list?  My apologies if that is the case, a pointer would 
> be helpful ...

Agreed. I understand that priorities shift like sands
in the desert.


>>> Labeled IPsec is likely out due to the way it was designed unless you
>>> want to attempt to negotiate two labels during the IKE exchange (yuck).  I
>>> think we can also rule out secmark as multi-LSM enabled due to the
>>> limitations on a 32 bit integer.
>> That was my take as well. But, since only SELinux uses those currently,
>> and I see little pressure for Smack to support them I don't have
>> a lot of incentive in that direction.
> Agreed.
>
>>>> If you have two LSMs that use secids you are never going to have a
>>>> rational way to get the information for both into one secid.
>>> Exactly, I don't disagree which is why I've always said that networking
>>> was going to be a major problem for the stacked LSM effort.  Unfortunately
>>> it sounds like you haven't yet made any serious effort into resolving that
>>> problem other than saying "don't do that".
>> Oh believe me, I have made serious effort. I just haven't made
>> significant progress.
> True, that wasn't a fair comment for me to make - my apologies.
>
>> The good news is that there can be a networking configuration (SELinux with
>> XFRM, Smack with Netlabel, AppArmor with none) that is both supported and
>> rational.
> I disagree that the approach you are proposing is the one that should be 
> adopted.  I am very much in favor of providing the ability to selectively 
> assign non-shareable LSM features when stacking.  If you aren't able to create 
> a mechanism to assign features when stacking, I think I would be more in favor 
> of a "first come, first served" model (the first LSM gets whatever it wants, 
> and each LSM stacked on top has to make do with what is left) over what you 
> are currently proposing.

Yeah, you have to give people rope. The Kconfig files can suggest
something rational, but in the end people do the darnedest things.
Especially with security.

>> Options I have considered include:
>> 	- Netlabel support for discriminating LSM use by host,
>> 	  just as it currently allows for unlabeled hosts.
> Hmm, interesting ... not sure what I think of this.

It breaks down on 127.0.0.1. Otherwise is looks pretty easy to do.

>> 	- Netlabel as an independent LSM. Lots of refactoring.
> Ungh, no.

4am, five time zones from home and hungover. The write-up looked
good, but it's a complete rewrite.

>> 	- secid maps.
> Can you elaborate on this?  I can think of a few different meanings here ...

This fell out of my first shot at stacking, the one that never saw
the light of day for tax reasons. I had implemented a stacker LSM
that slid into the existing infrastructure. Hooks that asked for
secids got the secid from my LSM, not the underlying LSM secids.
There was a table much like the Smack label list that mapped the
global secids to sets of underlying secids. The obvious problem
is that that table grows quickly and can never go away.


>> 	- Remove secids completely in favor of blobs.
> Obviously ideal, but unlikely to happen unless the netdev crew change their 
> mind on blobs in sk_buff.
>
>> I should have an updated patch set by month's end. I think it
>> will address the current LSM issues. I don't know that I can
>> say it will address everything new LSMs might want to try.
> I'll be sure to take a closer look then.  I should have taken a closer look at 
> your previous patches - my mistake and I'll take responsibility for that - but 
> based on the discussion from the last security summit I was under the 
> impression that stacking was only going to be allowed between "big" and 
> "little" LSMs, that is obviously no longer the case.

It seemed like that would be a reasonable approach until AppArmor
started looking like a "big" LSM.

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