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Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 11:50:27 +0200 From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com> To: David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM> CC: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next] x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks On 05/20/2013 10:51 AM, David Laight wrote: >> hpa bringed into my attention some security related issues >> with BPF JIT on x86. >> >> This patch makes sure the bpf generated code is marked read only, >> as other kernel text sections. >> >> It also splits the unused space (we vmalloc() and only use a fraction of >> the page) in two parts, so that the generated bpf code not starts at a >> known offset in the page, but a pseudo random one. > ... >> +static struct bpf_binary_header *bpf_alloc_binary(unsigned int proglen, >> + u8 **image_ptr) > ... >> + /* insert a random number of int3 instructions before BPF code */ >> + *image_ptr = &header->image[prandom_u32() % hole]; >> + return header; >> +} > > Hmmm.... anyone looking to overwrite kernel code will then start > looking for blocks of 0xcc bytes and know that what follows > is the beginning of a function. > That isn't any harder than random writes. > > Copying a random part of .rodata might be better - especially > if you can find part of .rodata.str*. Here seems also to be another approach ... http://grsecurity.net/~spender/jit_prot.diff via: http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/13dzhx/linux_kernel_jit_spray_for_smep_kernexec_bypass/ -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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