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Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2013 12:43:59 +0100
From: Christian Grothoff <grothoff@...tum.de>
To: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@...elbaum.net>
CC: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, knock@...net.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] TCP: add option for silent port knocking with integrity
protection
On 12/12/2013 11:19 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> I think that generally, I would prefer if the code didn't use MD5 but
> otherwise, I don't see any real risk of adding an exploitable hole. It
> seems silly to disable it by default though - ideally, I'd like a sysctl
> to ensure that Tor could use this without making the user recompile
> their kernel. That is more of a pain than running a userspace helper, I
> think.
>
> All the best,
> Jacob
Given that the output is truncated to 32 bits and that performance (SYN
flood) is also a concern, AND that the original TCP SQN generation is
also MD5-based (and we want to look the same), what disadvantage do you
see over MD5? Given the truncation to 32 bits, I don't think a stronger
hash would do anything for us.
As for it being disabled by default, we did this with respect to
kernel submission guidelines which we understood said that features
should _initially_ always be submitted with disabled-by-default
(presumably so that until they have stabilized, nobody is harmed
unless they explicitly activate the code).
I don't see the point in having a sysctl, as applications have to
explicitly request it anyway.
-Christian
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