lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Tue, 07 Jan 2014 17:11:00 +0100
From:	Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@...nd.com>
To:	Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org
CC:	Saurabh Mohan <saurabh.mohan@...tta.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/13] vti4: prepare namespace and interfamily support.

On 12/16/2013 10:18 AM, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> This patchset prepares vti4 for proper namespace and interfamily support.
>
> Currently the receive hook is in the middle of the decapsulation
> process, some of the header pointers point still into the IPsec packet
> others point already into the decapsulated packet. This makes it
> very unflexible and proper namespace and interfamily support can't
> be done as it is.
>
> The patchset that implements an IPsec protocol multiplexer, so that vti
> can register it's own receive path hooks. Further it makes the i_key
> usable for vti and changes the vti4 code to do the following:
>
> vti uses the IPsec protocol multiplexer to register it's
> own receive side hooks for ESP, AH and IPCOMP.
>
> Vti does the following on receive side:
>
> 1. Do an input policy check for the IPsec packet we received.
>     This is required because this packet could be already
>     processed by IPsec (tunnel in tunnel or a block policy
>     is present), so an inbound policy check is needed.
>
> 2. Clean the skb to not leak informations on namespace
>     transitions.
>
> 3. Mark the packet with the i_key. The policy and the state
>     must match this key now. Policy and state belong to the vti
>     namespace and policy enforcement is done at the further layers.
>
> 4. Call the generic xfrm layer to do decryption and decapsulation.
>
> 5. Wait for a callback from the xfrm layer to properly update
>     the device statistics.

Sorry for my late comments, I had to delay my tests due to Christmas and
New Year's celebrations.

I have a few comments about your proposed patches:

In input, the vti tunnel processing does not follow the usual tunnel
processing. Conventionally, the packets are first decapsulated, then
only the skbuff interface is changed to the tunnel interface. In the vti
code, the interface is changed before IPsec decryption, hence before
decapsulation.

It results in a configuration asymmetry when we later support cross
netns: the outer SAs and SPs must be defined in the outer netns, while
the inner SAs and SPs must be defined in the inner netns. This is a
little disturbing.

> On transmit side:
>
> 1. Mark the packet with the o_key. The policy and the state
>     must match this key now.
>
> 2. Do a xfrm_lookup on the original packet with the mark applied.
>
> 3. Check if we got an IPsec route.
>
> 4. Clean the skb to not leak informations on namespace
>     transitions.
>
> 5. Attach the dst_enty we got from the xfrm_lookup to the skb.
>
> 6. Call dst_output to do the IPsec processing.
>
> 7. Do the device statistics.

In output, when the route points to a vti interface, the global SPD
lookup is not bypassed: an SPD lookup is still performed for a global
SPD (i.e. without applying the vti mark). Then only the packet can enter
the vti interface, in which a second SPD lookup is done, in the vti
interface SPD (i.e. after applying the vti mark). Of course if the
global SPD lookup returned a tunnel mode policy, then the packet may
finally not enter the vti interface, because a new route is looked up
after the IPsec encapsulation.

My understanding of the vti interface interest is enabling to use
routing (possibly dynamic routes) *instead* of complex security
policies. And in this use case I expect that entering a vti interface
will *override* the global policies (in the same manner as socket
policies override the global policies).

Otherwise, if we want to mix global and vti policies on the same
machine, then we must carefully define global policies that do not match
traffic destined to vti interfaces.

Note that setting the NOXFRM flag on the vti interface does not work
around this issue, it disables both the global and vti SPD lookup and
the traffic is finally dropped.

> Changes from v1:
>
> - Rebased to current net-next.
> - Fix a rcu lockdep complaint in xfrm protocol registration/deregistration.
> - Fix usage of a ipv4 specific callback handler in generic code.
> - Use skb_scrub_packet() to clear the skb in vti_rcv(), suggested by
>    Nicolas Dichtel.
> - Add support for IPCOMP.
> - Support inter address family tunneling.
>
> I'd take this into the ipsec-next tree after some testing if noone
> has further suggestions or objections.
>
> I have the ipv6 side ready too, this will be a separate patchset.
> The ipv6 patchset has dependencies against the ipv4 patchset, so I
> hold it back until we have got the ipv4 side merged.
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ