netdev - RE: [E1000-devel] [PATCH 1/2] if_link: Add VF multicast promiscuous mode control

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Thu, 22 Jan 2015 09:50:00 +0000
From:	David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
To:	"'Skidmore, Donald C'" <donald.c.skidmore@...el.com>,
	Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@...jp.nec.com>,
	Bjørn Mork <bjorn@...k.no>
CC:	"e1000-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net" 
	<e1000-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net>,
	"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	"Choi, Sy Jong" <sy.jong.choi@...el.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Hayato Momma <h-momma@...jp.nec.com>
Subject: RE: [E1000-devel] [PATCH 1/2] if_link: Add VF multicast promiscuous
	mode control

From: Skidmore, Donald C 
> > > From: Hiroshi Shimamoto
> > > > My concern is what is the real issue that VF multicast promiscuous mode
> > can cause.
> > > > I think there is the 4k entries to filter multicast address, and the
> > > > current ixgbe/ixgbevf can turn all bits on from VM. That is almost same as
> > enabling multicast promiscuous mode.
> > > > I mean that we can receive all multicast addresses by an onerous
> > operation in untrusted VM.
> > > > I think we should clarify what is real security issue in this context.
> > >
> > > If you are worried about passing un-enabled multicasts to users then
> > > what about doing a software hash of received multicasts and checking
> > > against an actual list of multicasts enabled for that hash entry.
> > > Under normal conditions there is likely to be only a single address to check.
> > >
> > > It may (or may not) be best to use the same hash as any hashing
> > > hardware filter uses.
> >
> > thanks for the comment. But I don't think that is the point.
> >
> > I guess, introducing VF multicast promiscuous mode seems to add new
> > privilege to peek every multicast packet in VM and that doesn't look good.
> > On the other hand, I think that there has been the same privilege in the
> > current ixgbe/ixgbevf implementation already. Or I'm reading the code
> > wrongly.
> > I'd like to clarify what is the issue of allowing to receive all multicast packets.
> 
> Allowing a VM to give itself the privilege of seeing every multicast packet
> could be seen as a hole in VM isolation.
> Now if the host system allows this policy I don't see this as an issue as
> someone specifically allowed this to happen and then must not be concerned.
> We could even log that it has occurred, which I believe your patch did do.
> The issue is also further muddied, as you mentioned above, since some of
> these multicast packets are leaking anyway (the HW currently uses a 12 bit mask).
> It's just that this change would greatly enlarge that hole from a fraction to
> all multicast packets.

Why does it have anything to do with VM isolation?
Isn't is just the same as if the VM were connected directly to the
ethernet cable?

	David