Date:	Mon, 26 Jan 2015 07:33:59 -0500
From:	Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
To:	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
Cc:	davem@...emloft.net, vyasevich@...il.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free
 on INIT collisions

On Thu, Jan 22, 2015 at 06:26:54PM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as
> already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit
> auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally
> still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to
> have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ...
> 
> [  533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
> [  533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230
> [  533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0
> [  533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [  533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...]
> [  534.939704] Call Trace:
> [  534.951833]  [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
> [  534.984213]  [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
> [  535.015025]  [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170
> [  535.045661]  [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0
> [  535.074593]  [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50
> [  535.105239]  [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp]
> [  535.138606]  [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0
> [  535.166848]  [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
> 
> ... or depending on the the application, for example this one:
> 
> [ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
> [ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0
> [ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0
> [ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...]
> [ 1370.963431] Call Trace:
> [ 1370.974632]  [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
> [ 1371.000863]  [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
> [ 1371.027154]  [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170
> [ 1371.054679]  [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
> [ 1371.080183]  [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
> 
> With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten:
> 
> [  669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G        W     ): Poison overwritten
> [  669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
> [  669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494
> [  669.826424]  __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566
> [  669.826433]  __kmalloc+0x280/0x310
> [  669.826453]  sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
> [  669.826471]  sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp]
> [  669.826488]  sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp]
> [  669.826505]  sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...]
> [  669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494
> [  669.826635]  __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8
> [  669.826643]  kfree+0x1d6/0x230
> [  669.826650]  kzfree+0x31/0x40
> [  669.826666]  sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp]
> [  669.826681]  sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp]
> [  669.826695]  sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp]
> 
> Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at
> heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice
> when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again
> from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on
> the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation
> of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected
> at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation).
> 
> Reference counting of auth keys revisited:
> 
> Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations
> in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being
> added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached
> and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds
> a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which
> keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc
> or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and
> the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped.
> 
> User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct
> sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or
> adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes
> with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old
> sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt()
> on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either
> endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places)
> sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key().
> 
> sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's
> and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key
> directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops
> the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we
> eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with
> intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in
> sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to
> set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
> 
> To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret
> material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track
> of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76
> ("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of
> this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures
> being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly
> on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are
> being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount
> of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is
> to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics.
> 
> Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
> ---
>  net/sctp/associola.c | 1 -
>  1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
> index f791edd..26d06db 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/associola.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
> @@ -1182,7 +1182,6 @@ void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc,
>  	asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = new->peer.peer_hmacs;
>  	new->peer.peer_hmacs = NULL;
>  
> -	sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key);
>  	sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 1.7.11.7
> 
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> 
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>

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